Reported / Citable
Background
Zulema Vilar Ruiz, a Cuban national, entered the United States on November 30, 2021, and resided continuously in the country for approximately four years before her detention. She had no criminal record, maintained steady employment, and had established family and community ties. After applying for political asylum in October 2025, she was detained by ICE on November 13, 2025, when she appeared for a scheduled check-in appointment — despite having previously been released on her own recognizance with no indication she had violated any condition of release.
Vilar Ruiz filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing, among other claims, that her detention without any individualized custody determination violated her right to procedural due process. The government moved to dismiss, contending she was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that no further process was required. By the time the court ruled, an immigration judge had ordered her removed and her appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals had not yet been filed.
The court declined to address whether § 1225(b)(2) is facially unconstitutional — a question the Fifth Circuit had recently addressed in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), upholding mandatory detention of long-present noncitizens under that statute. Instead, Judge Hanks proceeded solely on the narrower ground of whether the statute, as applied to this petitioner, violated her procedural due process rights.
The Court’s Holding
Applying the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found all three factors weighed in the petitioner’s favor. First, her four-plus years of residence, employment, family ties, and prior release on recognizance established a constitutionally protected liberty interest in freedom from detention. Second, the absence of any individualized hearing — no notice, no opportunity to be heard, no assessment of flight risk or danger — created a high risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, a risk that could be readily addressed through a bond hearing. Third, the government offered no particularized justification for her continued detention, relying solely on the mandatory terms of the statute, which the court held cannot override constitutionally guaranteed process.
The court distinguished Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), which had rejected a facial due process challenge to mandatory detention of criminal aliens under § 1226(c), noting that Demore involved a criminal alien who had received prior procedural protections, faced statistically brief detention, and posed documented flight and recidivism risks — none of which applied here. The court likewise distinguished Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), observing that a challenge to detention, rather than to immigration proceedings or entry itself, does not implicate the plenary sovereign authority over admission and exclusion on which that decision rested.
The court granted the habeas petition and ordered the government to release Vilar Ruiz within 48 hours, return her identification documents, and refrain from re-detaining her during her removal proceedings absent a pre-detention hearing before an immigration judge at which the government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that she poses a flight risk or danger to the community.
Key Takeaways
- An as-applied due process challenge to immigration detention under § 1225(b)(2) survives even after the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez that the statute’s mandatory detention provisions are facially valid; the constitutional floor set by Mathews v. Eldridge remains independently applicable.
- A noncitizen who has resided in the United States for years, established community ties, and was previously released on recognizance acquires a protected liberty interest that triggers procedural due process protections before or upon re-detention.
- Detention of approximately seven months without any individualized hearing, with no government showing of flight risk or danger, satisfies all three Mathews factors in the detainee’s favor and warrants immediate release as the habeas remedy.
- Any future re-detention of the petitioner during her removal proceedings requires a pre-detention bond hearing before an immigration judge with the government bearing the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.
Why It Matters
This decision is one of a growing line of rulings from district courts across the country — including several from the Southern District of Texas — holding that mandatory civil immigration detention under § 1225(b)(2), when applied to noncitizens with established ties to the United States, must still comport with the Due Process Clause even if it is statutorily authorized. The opinion reinforces that Congress cannot, by statute alone, eliminate the constitutional minimum of notice and an individualized opportunity to be heard before depriving a person of the most fundamental liberty interest recognized in American law.
For practitioners, the decision illustrates a viable litigation path for detained noncitizens caught between the Fifth Circuit’s broad reading of § 1225(b)(2) in Buenrostro-Mendez and the constitutional guarantees that remain intact regardless of statutory text. The court’s insistence on a clear-and-convincing-evidence standard for any future re-detention — and its explicit prohibition on transfer or removal pending the order — also signals a willingness to use the full remedial power of the habeas writ to enforce the constitutional right it identifies.