Reported / Citable
Background
Manuel Enrique Perez Gil, a Venezuelan national, entered the United States without inspection in 2022. Shortly after entry he was apprehended, released, and enrolled in the Alternatives to Detention program, where he remained free under supervision for over three years with no criminal history. On March 29, 2026, immigration officials re-detained him. He received no bond hearing, as the government maintained he was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as an “applicant for admission.”
The government’s mandatory-detention position traces to July 2025 interim guidance from DHS and DOJ, later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), which extended Section 1225’s mandatory-detention authority to all noncitizens who have never been formally admitted, regardless of how or when they entered. In February 2026, the Fifth Circuit upheld that statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), but expressly left open whether such detention could survive a constitutional due process challenge.
Petitioner, proceeding pro se through a next friend, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that continued detention without any individualized bond hearing violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents moved for summary judgment, contending that Buenrostro foreclosed relief.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part, denied the government’s motion for summary judgment, and ordered ICE to release Petitioner by June 13, 2026. The court held that Buenrostro resolved only the statutory question and did not foreclose an as-applied due process challenge to detention under Section 1225(b)(2). Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found that Petitioner’s liberty interest — grounded in four years of U.S. residence and a prior release that created a reasonable expectation of freedom from detention during removal proceedings — outweighed the government’s interest in detention without individualized review.
The court declined to order a bond hearing rather than outright release, reasoning that: (1) the Fifth Circuit has held Section 1226(a), which provides for bond hearings, does not apply to applicants for admission; (2) a belated hearing would not cure the constitutional deprivation of liberty already suffered; and (3) the BIA’s position that immigration judges lack jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for persons detained under Section 1225(b)(2) made any ordered hearing illusory in practice.
The court further directed that upon release Petitioner must be freed in a public place during daytime hours, that all identification documents taken from him must be returned, and that he must be given a printed copy of the order. It also stated that if Petitioner were re-detained, he must be afforded individualized due process consistent with the Fifth Amendment.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all unadmitted noncitizens does not extinguish as-applied procedural due process challenges to mandatory detention; statutory authority and constitutional adequacy are separate inquiries.
- A noncitizen’s multi-year U.S. residence combined with a prior government-authorized release creates a cognizable liberty interest that triggers due process protections, including an individualized determination before civil detention is imposed or continued.
- Where the BIA has stripped immigration judges of jurisdiction to hold bond hearings for a class of detainees, ordering a bond hearing is an inadequate remedy; immediate release may be the only meaningful constitutional cure.
- This decision follows a pattern of S.D. Texas Laredo Division rulings — including Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi and Bonilla Barrios v. Noem — applying the same due-process framework to Section 1225(b)(2) detainees.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of district court rulings that have carved out constitutional space for immigration detainees even after Buenrostro-Mendez closed the statutory door on bond hearings for unadmitted noncitizens. By holding that liberty interests arising from long-term residence and prior government-supervised release require individualized detention justifications, the court signals that the government’s post-2025 mandatory-detention policy faces serious Fifth Amendment constraints that appellate courts have yet to fully resolve.
For immigration practitioners, the ruling clarifies that habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 remain a viable vehicle to challenge Section 1225(b)(2) detention on due process grounds in the Southern District of Texas, and that prior enrollment in the Alternatives to Detention program — and the expectation of liberty it generates — can be a decisive factor in the Mathews balancing analysis. The court’s insistence on release rather than a bond hearing also reflects practical recognition that an ordered remedy must be real, not theoretical.