Reported / Citable
Background
Marco Angele Hendrickson was indicted on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). He proceeded to trial pro se, with standby counsel, and was found guilty by a jury. On January 8, 2025, Judge Ada Brown sentenced him to 100 months of imprisonment, to run concurrently with any related state sentence, followed by three years of supervised release. Hendrickson’s direct appeal is currently pending before the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Hendrickson, No. 25-10167 (5th Cir.).
On March 17, 2026, while the case was closed and his appeal pending, Hendrickson filed a motion seeking two forms of relief: (1) disqualification and recusal of Judge Brown based on alleged bias and prejudice, and (2) an investigation into alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the underlying proceedings that he claimed violated his constitutional due process rights and right to a fair trial.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Brown denied both requests. On the recusal issue, the court applied the standards governing 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, which require that any alleged bias be personal in nature rather than judicial. Under Fifth Circuit precedent and the Supreme Court’s decision in Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), adverse rulings and judicial remarks — even critical or hostile ones — do not establish grounds for recusal unless they reveal an opinion based on an extrajudicial source or demonstrate such a high degree of antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible.
The court found that Hendrickson’s complaints amounted to nothing more than disagreement with adverse rulings and judicial statements made during the course of proceedings, none of which reflected extrajudicial bias or the requisite degree of antagonism. As to his request for an investigation into prosecutorial misconduct, the court noted that claims of constitutional violations arising from the criminal proceedings may be raised through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 — but only after Hendrickson’s conviction becomes final. Both requests were denied.
Key Takeaways
- Adverse trial rulings, admonishments, and critical judicial remarks do not support a claim of judicial bias under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 or 455 absent an extrajudicial source or deep-seated antagonism making fair judgment impossible.
- A defendant’s disagreement with how a judge resolved issues is insufficient to warrant recusal; the alleged bias must be personal, not judicial, in nature.
- Claims of prosecutorial misconduct that allegedly violated constitutional rights during criminal proceedings are properly raised via a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion after the conviction becomes final, not through a post-judgment motion in a closed district court case.
Why It Matters
This ruling is a straightforward application of well-settled recusal doctrine, reinforcing the high bar defendants must clear to disqualify a sitting judge based on conduct occurring within the proceedings themselves. Courts routinely deny recusal motions grounded solely in unfavorable rulings, and this decision underscores that such motions cannot serve as a vehicle for relitigating adverse outcomes.
For practitioners, the decision also serves as a reminder of the proper procedural channel for post-conviction constitutional claims: a § 2255 motion filed after the conviction is final. Filing such claims in a closed district court case — particularly while a direct appeal is pending — is procedurally premature and will not be entertained.