Reported / Citable
Background
Hernan Reinery Osorto-Diaz, a Honduran national, entered the United States with his family in December 2021. DHS initiated removal proceedings against him but released him on his own recognizance shortly after his arrival. He resided in the Austin, Texas area for more than four years while his removal case remained pending. In December 2025, ICE detained him following a traffic stop. An Immigration Judge ordered his removal in April 2026, and he timely appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, where the case remained pending at the time of the habeas petition.
The government argued that Osorto-Diaz was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) as an alien seeking admission, and that he was therefore ineligible for a bond hearing. Petitioner countered that his prolonged detention without any individualized assessment of flight risk or dangerousness violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The court had expedited the proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2243, ordering respondents to show cause within three days.
The court noted that it had previously held § 1225(b)(2) inapplicable to long-resident noncitizens on statutory grounds, but that the Fifth Circuit had recently rejected that statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Because Buenrostro-Mendez expressly left the constitutional question unaddressed, the court proceeded to the independent due process claim.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Robert Pitman granted the petition, holding that detaining Osorto-Diaz under § 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing violated the procedural due process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment. Applying the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found all three factors favored petitioner: his more than four years of liberty in the United States created a cognizable and weighty private interest; the absence of any individualized review created a serious risk of erroneous deprivation; and the government’s asserted interests in appearance and public safety would be fully addressed at a bond hearing — a process the government had itself conducted for decades until its recent reinterpretation of the statute.
The court rejected the government’s argument that DHS v. Thuraissigiam foreclosed the due process claim, distinguishing that case on two grounds: Osorto-Diaz did not challenge his admissibility or assert a right to remain, and — critically — unlike the petitioner in Thuraissigiam who was apprehended within yards of the border, Osorto-Diaz had lived in the United States for years, placing him within the full protection of the Due Process Clause under Zadvydas v. Davis. The court also rejected the government’s reliance on Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe and the unpublished Fifth Circuit decision in Wekesa, finding both inapposite in the context of an immigration detainee’s challenge to detention itself.
The court further noted that § 1225(b) detention is not truly “mandatory” in an absolute sense, because noncitizens may still be paroled on humanitarian grounds or significant public benefit under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) if they present neither a security risk nor a flight risk — meaning an individualized dangerousness and flight-risk determination is legally relevant, unlike the registration-hearing scenario in Doe. As the appropriate remedy for unlawful detention, the court ordered petitioner’s immediate release rather than merely a bond hearing, consistent with the growing body of district court decisions on the issue.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s statutory ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez — that § 1225(b)(2) applies to long-resident noncitizens — does not resolve the constitutional question; district courts retain authority to grant habeas relief on independent due process grounds.
- Under Mathews v. Eldridge, a noncitizen who has lived in the United States for years has a substantial liberty interest that the government cannot extinguish without an individualized bond hearing; detention under § 1225(b) without such a hearing fails constitutional scrutiny.
- The government’s characterization of § 1225(b) detention as “mandatory” is a misnomer — parole remains available based on flight risk and dangerousness findings, making those determinations legally material and triggering procedural due process protections.
- Where a due process violation is found, immediate release — not merely a bond hearing — is the appropriate remedy, because a post-deprivation hearing cannot cure the constitutional harm already suffered.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a significant and growing wave of federal district court rulings across Texas — and the country — holding that the government’s renewed application of § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention to long-resident noncitizens is unconstitutional as applied, even after the Fifth Circuit resolved the statutory question in the government’s favor. By grounding relief in the Due Process Clause rather than statutory interpretation, these courts have opened a path to release that Buenrostro-Mendez did not close.
For practitioners, the decision underscores that the constitutional and statutory arguments in § 1225(b) detention cases are analytically independent. Attorneys representing similarly situated clients — noncitizens who entered years ago, were released, and have since been re-detained — should raise procedural due process claims under the Fifth Amendment alongside any statutory arguments, and seek immediate release as the remedy rather than a simple remand for a bond hearing.