Reported / Citable
Background
Miguel Angel Tobar Reinosa, a citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States without admission or parole on June 18, 2019, and was subsequently released from Office of Refugee Resettlement custody to his mother in August 2019. He filed an asylum application in 2023. In September 2025, he was arrested at the Galveston County Jail on a public lewdness charge, after which Immigration and Customs Enforcement took him into custody and served him with a Notice to Appear charging inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled.
Removal proceedings were dismissed in November 2025 to allow USCIS to adjudicate the pending asylum application. Following a USCIS interview, the asylum application was referred back to immigration court in late November 2025 and remains pending. A second Notice to Appear was served on Petitioner in April 2026. He has remained in immigration custody throughout.
Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his continued detention without a bond hearing violated both the Immigration and Nationality Act and constitutional due process. The government moved for summary judgment, contending that Petitioner is an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). Petitioner did not file a response to the government’s motion despite a court-ordered deadline to do so.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and denied the habeas petition. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), the court held that because Petitioner’s presence in the United States without having been admitted deems him an applicant for admission, he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) pending the conclusion of applicable proceedings.
The court further held that this mandatory detention scheme does not violate substantive or procedural due process. Citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003), the court reiterated that detention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally permissible part of the removal process. On the procedural due process claim, the court reasoned that applicants for admission possess only those rights regarding admission that Congress has statutorily conferred, and because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention until certain proceedings conclude, Petitioner has no entitlement to a bond hearing.
The court entered final judgment in favor of the government respondents.
Key Takeaways
- An alien present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled is deemed an applicant for admission and subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), regardless of how long he has resided in the country.
- Mandatory detention of applicants for admission pending removal proceedings does not violate substantive or procedural due process under Demore v. Kim.
- Applicants for admission have no constitutional entitlement to a bond hearing; their rights regarding admission are limited to what Congress has expressly provided by statute.
- A pending asylum application does not convert an inadmissible alien into a person with broader detention rights or entitlement to release on bond.
Why It Matters
This decision reflects the Southern District of Texas’s consistent application of the Fifth Circuit’s 2026 ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, which resolved how courts in the circuit treat long-present undocumented individuals who were never formally admitted. Attorneys representing detained immigrants in the Fifth Circuit should be aware that arguments for a bond hearing grounded in due process or INA provisions will face a formidable mandatory-detention bar where the client entered without inspection and has not been formally admitted or paroled.
The case also underscores the practical importance of responding to government dispositive motions. Petitioner’s failure to oppose the summary judgment motion left the court to decide the constitutional and statutory questions solely on the government’s briefing, a posture that eliminated any opportunity to distinguish adverse precedents or develop a factual record that might have supported relief.