Reported / Citable
Background
Benilde Campos Bernal, a Cuban national, conceded that she unlawfully entered the United States in September 2022. On February 3, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security detained her pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), which mandates detention of aliens who are not clearly entitled to admission. She was held at the Houston Contract Detention Facility pending removal proceedings, without receiving an individualized bond hearing.
Campos Bernal filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 raising seven distinct grounds for relief: violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), substantive due process, procedural due process, equal protection, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Suspension Clause, and the Accardi Doctrine. The government moved for summary judgment on all claims.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Nicholas J. Ganjei granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and denied the habeas petition in full, dismissing the action with prejudice. On the statutory claim, the court found itself bound by the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which held that any alien present without lawful admission is “seeking admission” and thus subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). On the due process claims, the court held that pre-removal-order detention of an unlawfully present alien does not violate the Fifth Amendment, reasoning that Supreme Court precedent in Carlson, Reno, Zadvydas, and Demore collectively establishes that such detention is a constitutionally permissible part of the removal process and that the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing framework does not govern immigration detention challenges.
The court rejected the equal protection challenge because aliens unlawfully crossing the border are not similarly situated to those who entered lawfully and overstayed visas, and because § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention provision survives rational basis review. The APA claim failed because habeas corpus — not the APA — is the proper vehicle to challenge detention. The Suspension Clause claim was dismissed as self-defeating, given that § 1225(b)(2)(A) does not confer unfettered executive discretion and detained aliens may petition for habeas relief on any ground. Finally, the Accardi Doctrine claim failed because an unlawful arrest, even if proven, has no bearing on the legality of subsequent detention in a removal proceeding.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s 2026 ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi forecloses statutory challenges to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) for aliens who concede unlawful entry; district courts in the Fifth Circuit are bound by it.
- Pre-removal-order immigration detention does not trigger Mathews v. Eldridge procedural due process balancing; the court held that the statutory scheme itself provides all the process that is constitutionally due until a removal order issues.
- An unlawful arrest does not taint subsequent detention: under INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, a habeas petitioner cannot obtain release by challenging the legality of the underlying arrest, only the legality of the detention itself.
- The Suspension Clause is not violated by § 1225(b)(2)(A) because the statute conditions detention on an officer’s affirmative determination of inadmissibility and leaves the habeas remedy fully intact.
Why It Matters
This decision reflects a growing consensus among Southern District of Texas judges — joining colleagues who ruled similarly in Clavijo v. Thompson, Carnesolta v. Tate, and related cases — that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandatory detention withstands constitutional attack on every front currently being litigated. The opinion’s extended due process analysis, explaining why neither Mathews nor Glucksberg governs alien detention challenges, offers a detailed roadmap that could influence other district courts facing the same wave of habeas petitions filed by immigration detainees.
For practitioners, the ruling underscores that detainees subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A) — as opposed to § 1226 — face a markedly higher barrier to obtaining release, and that challenges grounded in alleged arrest-procedure violations under 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(c) will not succeed in habeas proceedings. The court also explicitly preserved the petitioner’s statutory and Loper Bright arguments for potential en banc or Supreme Court review, signaling that the circuit-level questions are not entirely settled.