Reported / Citable
Background
Jesus Hector Ramirez-Alonso, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in 1995 and has resided here continuously for over three decades. On April 20, 2026, ICE arrested and detained him without a bond hearing at the Karnes County Immigration Processing Center. Ramirez-Alonso petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his detention as violating both the Immigration and Nationality Act and his constitutional due process rights.
The government justified the detention under a policy shift initiated in July 2025. Through the “Lyons Memo,” the Department of Homeland Security “revisited its legal position” and declared that noncitizens who entered without inspection are “applicants for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), rather than discretionary detention under § 1226(a) which provides bond hearing rights. This interpretation departed from nearly three decades of prior practice. The Board of Immigration Appeals subsequently adopted this position in Matter of Yajure Hurtado.
The Fifth Circuit’s February 2026 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez foreclosed statutory challenges to this detention scheme, but explicitly did not address constitutional due process claims, instead remanding for further proceedings on that issue.
The Court’s Holding
The Western District court granted the petition and ordered Ramirez-Alonso’s release, holding that detention without a bond hearing violates procedural due process. While acknowledging that the statutory question was foreclosed by Buenrostro-Mendez, the court found that constitutional protections remain available and apply here. The court rejected the government’s reliance on Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam‘s “entry fiction”—which treats applicants for admission as if stopped at the border—on two grounds.
First, Ramirez-Alonso challenges detention itself, not the admissibility determination or removal process. The constitutional analysis cannot turn solely on statutory characterization; once due process applies, the question becomes what process is due. Second, Ramirez-Alonso’s 31-year substantial presence in the United States distinguishes him from someone detained at the border’s threshold. The Due Process Clause protects “all persons within the territory of the United States,” and when noncitizens have entered or been released into the interior and developed substantial connections to the country, they receive greater constitutional protections than those at ports of entry.
Under the three-factor Mathews v. Eldridge test, the court found that the liberty interest in freedom from detention, the risk of erroneous deprivation without individualized assessment, and the modest burden of providing a bond hearing all weigh heavily in favor of requiring process. The court noted that civil detention cannot be purely punitive and must rest on individualized findings of flight risk or dangerousness—determinations that have long been central to immigration detention law.
Key Takeaways
- Constitutional due process claims to immigration detention survive the Fifth Circuit’s Buenrostro-Mendez decision, which only foreclosed statutory challenges.
- The “entry fiction” from Thuraissigiam applies only to noncitizens at the threshold of initial entry, not those with substantial presence and connections in the United States.
- Noncitizens detained in the interior after establishing residence for extended periods cannot constitutionally be detained without individualized findings regarding flight risk and dangerousness.
- A growing consensus among district courts in the Fifth Circuit has adopted similar reasoning: detention under the new § 1225(b) interpretation without bond hearings violates procedural due process for noncitizens with substantial presence.
Why It Matters
This decision creates a significant constitutional limit on the government’s ability to detain noncitizens under its July 2025 reinterpretation of § 1225(b). Although the Fifth Circuit closed the statutory pathway in Buenrostro-Mendez, this ruling establishes that constitutional due process challenges remain viable and likely successful for noncitizens who have lived in the country and developed ties here. The distinction between applicants for admission “at the threshold” versus those with substantial presence could prove outcome-determinative in numerous pending cases.
The decision also signals a potential shift in how courts view the geographic and temporal dimensions of due process protections in immigration law. By emphasizing that erasing years of presence “is, in essence, to erase his rights,” the court has articulated a principle that may extend beyond this case. Multiple other district courts have already granted similar habeas relief post-Buenrostro-Mendez on procedural due process grounds, suggesting that this constitutional pathway may become the primary avenue for challenging detention under the government’s new policy, even though the statutory route is now closed.