Reported / Citable
Background
Martin Franco Sanchez, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States in 2008 and has resided here continuously for 18 years. On May 18, 2026, ICE arrested and detained him without a bond hearing. The government classified him as an “applicant for admission” under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), subject to mandatory detention without bond hearing eligibility, rather than applying the discretionary detention rules of § 1226(a) that would have entitled him to a hearing.
This reclassification reflected a policy shift: for nearly three decades, ICE had treated noncitizens present in the U.S. without admission or parole as subject to § 1226(a) and entitled to bond hearings. In July 2025, ICE reversed its position through an internal memorandum (the Lyons Memo), and the Board of Immigration Appeals adopted this interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado (2025). Sanchez filed a habeas petition challenging both the statutory interpretation and the detention on constitutional grounds.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the habeas petition on procedural due process grounds and ordered Sanchez’s release by July 1, 2026. While acknowledging the Fifth Circuit’s February 2026 decision in Buenrostro-Mendez foreclosed statutory challenges to the government’s Section 1225 interpretation, the court held that Buenrostro-Mendez did not address—and did not foreclose—constitutional due process claims.
The court rejected the government’s reliance on Thuraissigiam v. Department of Homeland Security (2020), which established limited due process rights for aliens “at the threshold of initial entry.” The court identified two critical distinctions: Sanchez challenges detention procedures, not admission procedures, and unlike Thuraissigiam (detained 25 yards from the border), Sanchez had established substantial presence in the U.S. over 18 years. Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, the court found that all three factors—the individual’s liberty interest, the risk of erroneous deprivation without an individualized hearing, and minimal governmental burden—support requiring an individualized assessment of flight risk and dangerousness before detention.
The court held that the “entry fiction” applicable to removal proceedings does not extend to civil detention of noncitizens with substantial territorial presence in the country. For such immigrants, constitutional due process protections apply despite the statutory language mandating detention.
Key Takeaways
- Federal courts retain habeas jurisdiction to challenge immigration detention despite statutory language, and neither administrative exhaustion nor prior Fifth Circuit statutory rulings bar constitutional due process claims.
- Thuraissigiam’s limited due process framework applies only to aliens at the border; noncitizens with substantial U.S. presence (residence, entry, or release into the interior) are entitled to procedural due process protections.
- Even mandatory detention statutes are subject to constitutional constraints: detaining immigrants without individualized findings regarding flight risk and dangerousness violates procedural due process when they have established substantial presence.
- The government’s policy reversal (Lyons Memo and Yajure Hurtado) cannot override constitutional requirements, and circular statutory arguments do not satisfy due process analysis.
Why It Matters
This decision potentially affects thousands of immigrants detained under the government’s post-July 2025 interpretation of § 1225(b). By distinguishing between border enforcement and detention of those with U.S. presence, the court creates a significant constitutional floor for detention procedures regardless of statutory language. Although Buenrostro-Mendez closed a statutory argument, multiple district courts have now applied this due process reasoning to grant habeas relief.
The holding reflects a judicial consensus that territorial presence and liberty interests trigger meaningful procedural protections. The court explicitly departed from two of its earlier holdings (Canales-Melgar v. Noem and Goguev v. Noem) to align with this emerging standard, signaling potential appellate implications. For practitioners, the decision preserves viable constitutional challenges even after adverse statutory rulings and underscores that Mathews balancing, not statutory categorization alone, determines what process is due in immigration detention.