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Obeginski v. Elizondo — affirmed judgment awarding title and possession to foreclosure purchaser

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Scott Mitchell Obeginski v. Jaul Ray Elizondo
Court
Texas Ninth Court of Appeals at Beaumont
Judge
W. Scott Golemon (elected 2021)
Date Decided
August 6, 2026
Docket No.
09-24-00293-CV
Topics
Foreclosure; Property Title; Subject-Matter Jurisdiction; Trial Notice
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

After Scott Mitchell Obeginski’s home was sold at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, purchaser Jaul Ray Elizondo received a substitute trustee’s deed that misspelled his surname as “Elizando.” Obeginski subsequently created entities and used an assumed name matching that misspelling to execute and record documents purporting to transfer interests in the property. Obeginski remained in possession and sued Elizondo for what he described as trespass or harassment.

Elizondo counterclaimed for trespass to try title, removal of clouds on title, possession, declaratory and injunctive relief, damages, and attorney’s fees. After Obeginski failed to appear for the August 26, 2024 bench trial, the district court rendered a post-answer default judgment declaring Elizondo the lawful owner, awarding him title and immediate possession, judicially correcting the foreclosure deed, and nullifying documents recorded by Obeginski that clouded Elizondo’s title. Obeginski appealed, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction, several pretrial rulings, and the adequacy of notice that trial would proceed.

The Court’s Holding

The Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that Elizondo had standing because he alleged a concrete injury traceable to Obeginski’s conduct that could be remedied by a court order. The district court also had subject-matter jurisdiction because determining the right to possession required resolving the parties’ title dispute; that dispute was not within a justice court’s exclusive eviction jurisdiction. Dismissal of Obeginski’s own harassment claim did not eliminate the live controversy presented by Elizondo’s counterclaims.

The court also upheld the rulings rejecting Obeginski’s challenges to Elizondo’s attorney’s authority. Evidence showed that counsel was licensed and retained by Elizondo, and the record refuted Obeginski’s allegation that the trial judge signed an order before the scheduled submission. For later hearings, the absence of a reporter’s record required the appellate court to presume the evidence supported the trial court’s rulings.

Finally, the court rejected Obeginski’s Rule 245 and due-process arguments. The August 26 trial was never reset: after the regional presiding judge denied Obeginski’s second recusal motion that morning, the court notified the parties before noon that trial would proceed at the previously scheduled time. Because Obeginski did not specifically challenge the pertinent findings of fact and supplied no reporter’s record, the appellate court accepted the supported findings that he had sufficient notice and intentionally failed to appear.

Key Takeaways

  • A district court may adjudicate title and award possession when the right to immediate possession depends on resolving a title dispute.
  • Rule 245’s reasonable-notice requirement for resetting a previously scheduled trial does not require a new setting when the original setting remains in place.
  • An appellant who omits the reporter’s record generally cannot overcome findings dependent on evidence presented at unrecorded hearings or trial.

Why It Matters

The decision distinguishes a title-and-possession dispute within district-court jurisdiction from a summary forcible-detainer proceeding limited to immediate possession. A party cannot recast a dispute requiring adjudication of title as one belonging exclusively in justice court.

It also underscores the appellate consequences of failing to provide a reporter’s record or challenge specific findings after a bench trial. Electronic notice that a previously scheduled trial will proceed, together with record evidence of actual or constructive knowledge, may defeat a due-process claim based on an asserted resetting.

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