Reported / Citable
Background
Pro se plaintiff Cheryl Sims sought an ex parte temporary restraining order against Michael Grannan. She asked the court to bar Grannan from contacting or harassing her and her witnesses, and from using custody orders or purportedly bad-faith state processes to cause her arrest.
Sims also sought to vacate a Pennsylvania child-custody order, restore a 2016 Texas custody order, and obtain civil RICO and civil-rights damages. A magistrate judge recommended denying the TRO. Although Sims’s objections were untimely, the district court considered them and conducted de novo review.
The Court’s Holding
The court overruled Sims’s objections, adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, and denied the requested TRO. It held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over claims seeking to invalidate the Pennsylvania custody order and claims whose alleged injuries arose from the state proceedings and judgment.
The court also rejected Sims’s argument under the Indian Child Welfare Act because she alleged only that her visitation had been reduced to once a year, not that her parental rights had been terminated. As to the asserted threat of arrest, the court held that Sims alleged only a speculative fear rather than an actual threatened injury, failed to show likely success on an underlying claim, and effectively sought to restrain Texas criminal-law enforcement even though neither the State nor a state representative was a party.
Key Takeaways
- A federal district court cannot use a TRO proceeding to review and vacate a state child-custody judgment.
- Reduced visitation does not, without more, constitute termination of parental rights under ICWA.
- Speculative allegations of a possible arrest do not establish the imminent irreparable injury required for emergency injunctive relief.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates the jurisdictional limits on federal challenges tied to state custody proceedings, even when a plaintiff frames the claims as RICO or civil-rights violations. It also underscores that a TRO applicant must provide concrete evidence of a real and imminent injury, not an unfounded fear of future enforcement action.