Texas Case Summaries

In the Interest of A.A. — Texas appeals court reverses parental-rights termination for factual insufficiency; dissent would affirm

Reported / Citable

Case
In the Interest of A.A., a Child
Court
Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas
Date Decided
June 11, 2026
Docket No.
01-25-01074-CV
Topics
Parental Rights Termination, Best Interest of Child, Factual Sufficiency, Family Law

Background

A.A. was born in June 2024. By five months of age, she was so developmentally delayed from a lack of care that she could not hold her head up and functioned like a one-week-old newborn. In October 2024, Mother became intoxicated at home with A.A. present, assaulted her boyfriend during a domestic dispute, and was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for a week after making statements about a suicide attempt that morning. With no one to care for A.A., the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services took custody. The 313th District Court of Harris County subsequently terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding she committed statutory predicate acts and that termination was in A.A.’s best interest under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b).

Mother’s history was extensive. Her parental rights to five other children had previously been terminated on endangerment grounds. Her CPS history spanned from 2014 through 2020 and included findings of neglectful supervision, episodes of domestic violence in the children’s presence, a child who tested positive for amphetamines at birth, and Mother testing positive for methamphetamines. During the pendency of this case, Mother did not consistently take prescribed mental-health medications, did not begin attending the required Alcoholics Anonymous meetings until approximately two months before the October 2025 trial, cycled through four jobs in a single year, and moved into a residence with a man who had a history of drug use after being removed from her prior home following another dispute with her boyfriend.

On appeal, the two-justice majority held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the predicate-act and best-interest findings, but factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding, reversing the termination. Justice Johnson dissented, concluding the evidence was factually sufficient to affirm the trial court in full.

The Court’s Holding

The majority (Justices Rivas-Molloy and Dokupil) reversed the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights, finding the evidence factually insufficient to support the best-interest finding. The majority apparently credited as too weighty the undisputed evidence in Mother’s favor — fifteen clean drug and alcohol tests, consistent visitation with A.A., and substantial completion of her family services plan — concluding that evidence could not be resolved in favor of termination under the heightened factual-sufficiency standard applicable in parental-termination appeals. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630–31 (Tex. 2018).

Justice Johnson dissented, reasoning that while the undisputed favorable evidence existed, it was not so significant as to prevent a reasonable factfinder from forming a firm belief or conviction that termination was in A.A.’s best interest. The dissent emphasized that Mother’s failures during the very period her parental rights were on the line — unilaterally discontinuing mental-health medications, grossly delaying AA attendance, choosing unstable and dangerous living situations, and cycling through employment — when weighed against her lengthy documented history of mental illness, substance abuse, and child neglect, provided ample basis for the trial court’s finding. The dissent concluded that the bulk of the Holley factors, see Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976), weighed in favor of termination.

Key Takeaways

  • The majority reversed on factual sufficiency of the best-interest finding, despite agreeing the predicate-act findings and the legal sufficiency of the best-interest finding were supported — illustrating the meaningful gap between legal and factual sufficiency review in Texas termination cases.
  • The dissent stressed that a parent’s conduct during the pendency of the termination case — particularly non-compliance with mental-health treatment and other service-plan requirements — is highly probative of future fitness and the child’s best interest.
  • Under In re A.C., factual-sufficiency review in termination cases requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all supporting evidence; the majority and dissent disagreed sharply on whether Mother’s positive steps during the case created sufficient “disputed” evidence to undercut the trial court’s finding.
  • A prior termination of parental rights to multiple other children on endangerment grounds, combined with ongoing instability, remained central to the best-interest analysis regardless of short-term compliance gains.

Why It Matters

This 2-1 decision highlights the practical stakes of the legal/factual sufficiency distinction in Texas parental-termination appeals. Even where a parent makes demonstrable progress — clean drug tests, completed services, regular visits — a majority panel can find that such progress, if disputed or outweighed by a history of chronic instability and non-compliance, tips the factual-sufficiency scale against termination. Practitioners on both sides of these cases must be prepared to address not just whether favorable evidence exists, but whether a reasonable factfinder could have discounted it in forming a firm conviction.

The dissent raises a pointed concern: reversing a termination where the trial court — which observed the witnesses and weighed the evidence firsthand — found the totality of circumstances warranted termination may extend the period of uncertainty for a young child with acute developmental needs. As the Texas Supreme Court has recognized, undue uncertainty and delay in determining a child’s permanent placement itself threatens the child’s best interest. In re K.S.L., 538 S.W.3d 107, 115 (Tex. 2017). The case may draw further attention on petition to the Texas Supreme Court.

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