Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed E.O. from Mother’s care after Mother admitted that she had relapsed and described recent mental-health episodes. The Department’s termination petition named Father and two other men as possible fathers. Father promptly contacted the Department, cooperated, requested genetic testing, and expressed interest in caring for the child. His paternity was not confirmed until January 2025, several months after the removal.
Father initially participated in the proceedings and visited the child, but he later stopped attempting to comply with his service plan and ceased visitation. Following a multi-day final hearing, the trial court terminated his parental rights under Texas Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N). On appeal, Father challenged only the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the subsection (D) finding that he knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
The Court’s Holding
The Seventh Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the subsection (D) finding. The Department did not establish that Father knew he was E.O.’s parent before removal, controlled the child’s environment during the relevant period, knew about Mother’s relapse, or ever had the child in his care. Testimony suggesting Father may have stayed with Mother at some point did not establish when or for how long he stayed there, his degree of contact with Mother or the child, or his knowledge of conditions in the home.
Because the evidence created only a suspicion that Father knew of Mother’s relapse, it did not clearly and convincingly prove that he knowingly placed or allowed E.O. to remain in an endangering environment. The court therefore deleted the subsection (D) finding. It nevertheless affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights because he did not challenge the independent subsection (E) and (N) grounds supporting the judgment.
Key Takeaways
- A subsection (D) finding requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
- The relevant period for a subsection (D) inquiry is before the child’s removal, and speculation about a parent’s presence in the home or knowledge of its conditions is insufficient.
- An appellate court must review a challenged subsection (D) or (E) finding because it can affect later proceedings involving other children, even when an unchallenged ground independently requires affirmance.
- Deleting one predicate finding does not undo termination when other independent termination grounds remain unchallenged.
Why It Matters
The decision underscores the Department’s burden to connect a parent, through evidence rather than suspicion, to the child’s pre-removal environment and to show the parent’s knowledge of the alleged danger. Uncertain paternity and unproven involvement in the home could not support the subsection (D) finding here.
The ruling also illustrates the distinct appellate consequences of endangerment findings: although Father’s unchallenged subsection (E) and (N) grounds preserved the termination judgment, due process required review of the challenged subsection (D) finding because it could be used in a future termination case involving another child.