Reported / Citable
Background
William Kent McIlyar alleged that the City of Corpus Christi employed him as an Assistant City Attorney from July 2017 until terminating him in November 2023. His amended complaint asserted age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, sex discrimination under Title VII, and retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act.
McIlyar alleged that the City replaced him with substantially younger, less-experienced attorneys and treated younger female assistant city attorneys more favorably regarding remote work, leave, discipline, supervision, promotions, pay, and workload. He also alleged that the City terminated him three days after he emailed his supervisor a reminder that he planned to take FMLA leave to care for his adult daughter around the birth of her child. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that the allegations did not plausibly establish discrimination or FMLA-protected activity and that poor performance and insufficient work hours supplied an alternative explanation for the termination.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby recommended denying the City’s motion to dismiss. He concluded that McIlyar plausibly alleged that his termination occurred because of age or sex. The allegations concerning substantially younger replacements and specifically identified female coworkers who allegedly received more favorable treatment were sufficiently detailed at the pleading stage. Whether those employees were truly similarly situated, and whether the City had legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the termination, were matters better addressed on summary judgment.
The magistrate judge also recommended allowing the FMLA retaliation claim to proceed. Although the FMLA does not protect leave merely to assist with the birth of a grandchild, leave to care for an adult child may qualify if the child is incapable of self-care because of a disability or has a qualifying serious health condition. McIlyar did not plead those circumstances expressly, but his alleged request for “FMLA leave” to care for his pregnant daughter could have triggered the City’s duty to seek further information. Whether the daughter’s condition actually qualified and whether McIlyar gave adequate notice required factual development. His termination three days after the reminder email also plausibly alleged causation. The magistrate judge separately recommended denying the City’s earlier dismissal motion as moot and, if the recommendation were not adopted, denying McIlyar another opportunity to amend.
Key Takeaways
- An employment-discrimination plaintiff need not establish every element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case at the motion-to-dismiss stage; facts plausibly connecting an adverse action to protected status are sufficient.
- Challenges to comparator similarity and an employer’s asserted nondiscriminatory reasons generally involve fact-intensive questions more appropriate for summary judgment.
- A specific request for FMLA leave may require an employer to inquire further about whether the underlying medical circumstances qualify, and a three-day interval between a leave reminder and termination can plausibly support causation.
Why It Matters
The recommendation illustrates the limited role of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion in employment cases. Courts should test whether the pleaded facts make discrimination or retaliation plausible, not resolve factual disputes over performance, comparators, or the employer’s stated reasons.
It also highlights the factual nuance of FMLA requests involving an adult child’s pregnancy. A routine childbirth or desire to assist with a grandchild ordinarily is not enough, but circumstances involving incapacity or a serious health condition may qualify and can require further inquiry by the employer.