Reported / Citable
Background
Charles Devon Wasserman is serving a 99-year Texas sentence for aggravated sexual assault of his girlfriend’s 17-month-old son. At his 2013 trial, the State presented medical testimony that the child had suffered a penetrating rectal injury consistent with deliberate abuse, along with DNA evidence linking the child to a razor, shirt, and towel identified as Wasserman’s property.
Wasserman’s conviction became final after the Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 5, 2015. He filed a state habeas application in November 2021, which was denied in 2022, and filed this federal habeas petition in June 2025. He contended that later-retained experts and medical records supported a non-abuse explanation for the child’s condition and established actual innocence.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Jason B. Libby recommended granting the respondent’s summary-judgment motion and dismissing the petition as barred by AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. The deadline expired on October 5, 2016; the state habeas application filed years later could not restart or toll an already-expired limitations period.
The recommendation concluded that Wasserman had not shown grounds for equitable tolling or satisfied the demanding actual-innocence gateway standard. The medical records and expert opinions relied on records available to the defense before trial, and at most created competing medical views rather than showing that no reasonable juror could have convicted in light of the trial evidence. The magistrate judge also recommended denying discovery, an evidentiary hearing, and a certificate of appealability.
Key Takeaways
- A federal habeas petition filed more than eight years after the AEDPA deadline was untimely.
- A later state habeas filing does not toll a limitations period that has already expired.
- Conflicting post-trial expert opinions did not establish the actual-innocence gateway where the underlying medical records were available at trial and other inculpatory evidence remained.
Why It Matters
The recommendation illustrates the narrowness of the actual-innocence exception to AEDPA’s limitations period. New interpretations of previously available evidence, even if they support a defense theory, ordinarily will not suffice without a showing that no reasonable juror would have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
This was a magistrate judge’s memorandum and recommendation, subject to objections and review by the district judge; it was not itself the district court’s final judgment.