Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
San Ynes Patino was convicted of possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His predicate felony was a conviction for simple drug possession.
On appeal, Patino argued that applying § 922(g)(1) to him violated the Second Amendment. The government conceded that the Fifth Circuit’s intervening decision in United States v. Hembree required reversal because Hembree held the statute unconstitutional as applied to a defendant whose predicate felony was simple drug possession.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit held that § 922(g)(1), as applied to Patino, violated the Second Amendment. Because Patino’s firearm conviction rested on the same kind of predicate felony addressed in Hembree—simple drug possession—the court concluded that Hembree controlled.
The court reversed Patino’s § 922(g)(1) conviction. The per curiam opinion was issued on the summary calendar and was not designated for publication.
Key Takeaways
- Under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, a simple drug-possession felony cannot constitutionally support Patino’s prosecution under § 922(g)(1).
- The ruling is expressly as applied to Patino and does not invalidate § 922(g)(1) in all circumstances.
- The government conceded that United States v. Hembree required reversal.
Why It Matters
The decision applies Hembree to another defendant whose felon-in-possession conviction was based on simple drug possession. It confirms that, within the Fifth Circuit, the nature of the predicate felony can determine whether § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied.