Reported / Citable
Background
Ricardo Medina-Perez was charged in Count One of an indictment with illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1) or (2). The district court referred the administration of his guilty plea and allocution to U.S. Magistrate Judge Ronald C. Griffin under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
At the August 5, 2026 hearing, Medina-Perez consented in writing to proceed before the magistrate judge and pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement. An interpreter assisted him, and Medina-Perez acknowledged discussing the plea’s adverse immigration consequences with counsel.
The Court’s Holding
After conducting the plea proceeding under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, the magistrate judge found that Medina-Perez knowingly and voluntarily consented to the proceeding, was competent to enter an informed plea, understood the charge and the consequences of pleading guilty, and entered a knowing and voluntary plea.
The magistrate judge also found an independent factual basis supporting every essential element of the offense. He therefore recommended—not finally ordered—that the district court accept the guilty plea and adjudge Medina-Perez guilty. The district judge retained responsibility for final approval and sentencing.
Key Takeaways
- Medina-Perez pleaded guilty to illegal reentry without a written plea agreement.
- The magistrate judge found the plea knowing, voluntary, competent, and supported by an adequate factual basis.
- The filing is a report and recommendation subject to district-court approval, with objections due within 14 days after service.
Why It Matters
The recommendation documents the Rule 11 safeguards required before a federal felony guilty plea may be accepted, including confirmation of competence, voluntariness, awareness of possible penalties, and a factual basis for the charge.
It also illustrates the limited role of a magistrate judge in this posture: the magistrate judge administered the plea with the defendant’s consent and recommended acceptance, while final adjudication and sentencing remained with the district judge.