Reported / Citable
Background
In December 2013, a jury convicted Reynaldo Macedo-Flores of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine, obstruction of justice, and perjury. He was sentenced in April 2014 to 300 months’ imprisonment. His sentence was affirmed on appeal, and the district court previously denied his initial motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Seeking to file a second § 2255 motion, Macedo-Flores filed a Motion to Compel seeking pre-motion discovery from the Government. Specifically, he sought FBI 302 reports, video and audio recordings, pen register data, and an affidavit from FBI Agent Byron Boston regarding conversations at a liquor store prior to March 29, 2012. He argued this material would support an entrapment defense and thereby establish his actual innocence, allowing him to overcome AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations under McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013).
No § 2255 motion was pending at the time he filed the motion to compel.
The Court’s Holding
Chief Judge Reed O’Connor denied the motion on two independent grounds. First, the court found no legal authority for post-conviction discovery outside the framework of a pending § 2255 proceeding. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 imposes a disclosure duty only “before or during trial” and creates no post-conviction discovery obligation. Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings permits discovery upon a showing of good cause, but only when a § 2255 motion is actually pending — which was not the case here.
Second, and alternatively, the court held that even if the procedural prerequisites were met, Macedo-Flores had not shown good cause for the requested discovery. His theory — that evidence of pre-offense government contact would support an entrapment defense — could establish only legal innocence, not factual innocence. Under Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), the actual-innocence gateway requires a showing of factual innocence, and entrapment is a legal defense that does not satisfy that standard.
Because the sought-after evidence could not demonstrate factual innocence, it could not serve as a gateway to excuse the AEDPA limitations bar under McQuiggin, and good cause for discovery was therefore absent regardless of the procedural posture.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 6(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings is a prerequisite, not a free-standing discovery vehicle — a § 2255 motion must be pending before a defendant can seek discovery under that rule.
- Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 imposes no discovery duty on the Government after trial concludes; its obligations extend only through the trial phase.
- An entrapment defense establishes only legal innocence, not factual innocence, and therefore cannot satisfy the actual-innocence exception to AEDPA’s statute of limitations under McQuiggin v. Perkins.
- To demonstrate good cause for § 2255 discovery, a defendant must show the evidence sought could actually establish factual innocence — a speculative or legally insufficient theory will not suffice.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the narrow scope of post-conviction discovery available to federal defendants and clarifies the interplay between the actual-innocence gateway and the type of innocence required to invoke it. Courts have consistently distinguished between legal defenses — which negate criminal liability through doctrines like entrapment — and factual innocence, which requires affirmative evidence that the defendant did not commit the underlying conduct. Defendants hoping to use McQuiggin to revive time-barred § 2255 claims must do more than identify a viable trial defense.
The ruling also serves as a practical reminder that post-conviction discovery is tightly cabined by the procedural posture of the case. Without a pending habeas motion, there is no vehicle for compelling government disclosures, and courts are unlikely to treat a motion to compel as a workaround for initiating what would otherwise be an unauthorized successive or untimely collateral attack.