Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rollie Andre Lott received an 18-month sentence after the district court revoked his supervised release. On appeal, he argued that the court improperly relied on his lack of respect for the law, a retributive consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A).
Section 3583(e) permits courts imposing revocation sentences to consider specified factors, including the defendant’s history and characteristics, deterrence, and protection of the public. The Supreme Court held in Esteras v. United States that courts may not consider the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors—offense seriousness, respect for the law, and just punishment—when revoking supervised release because Congress excluded those factors. Lott did not preserve his objection in the district court, so the Fifth Circuit reviewed only for plain error.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that Lott had not shown a clear or obvious error. Read in context, the district court’s reference to Lott’s “egregious disregard for the law” addressed his failure to comply with the terms and conditions of supervised release rather than an impermissible reliance on retribution for his underlying offense.
The panel therefore did not decide how Esteras affects the Fifth Circuit’s prior rule that reliance on a forbidden factor warrants reversal only when that factor was a dominant consideration. It also did not resolve whether § 3583(e) permits consideration of retribution for violations of supervised-release conditions, as distinct from retribution for the underlying conviction.
Key Takeaways
- A district court may not base a supervised-release revocation sentence on the retributive factors listed in § 3553(a)(2)(A).
- A remark about disregard for the law is not necessarily improper when its context shows that it concerns noncompliance with supervised-release conditions.
- Because Lott failed to preserve his objection, he had to establish a clear or obvious error and did not do so.
Why It Matters
The decision shows that appellate courts will evaluate sentencing remarks in their full context rather than treating language resembling a prohibited factor as automatically reversible. It also leaves unresolved important post-Esteras questions about the continued force of the Fifth Circuit’s dominant-factor approach and the permissible consideration of a defendant’s supervised-release violations.