Reported / Citable
Background
Richard Grote, a previously convicted felon, was indicted by a grand jury in March 2026 for knowingly possessing a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8), the federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms that have traveled in interstate commerce. On June 8, 2026, Grote moved to dismiss the indictment on three constitutional grounds before the case proceeded to trial.
Grote argued that § 922(g)(1) exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, was unconstitutionally vague under the void for vagueness doctrine, and violated the Second Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen. On each ground, Grote acknowledged that existing Fifth Circuit precedent ran against him but preserved the arguments for potential appellate review.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Mark T. Pittman denied the motion to dismiss on all three grounds. On the Commerce Clause and vagueness arguments, the court found that binding Fifth Circuit precedent squarely foreclosed Grote’s positions, and that Grote had cited no contrary authority. The court noted that circuits have uniformly upheld § 922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of the commerce power, and that the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly rejected vagueness challenges to the same provision in recent decisions including United States v. Landrum (5th Cir. 2026) and United States v. Bonner (5th Cir. 2025).
On the Second Amendment challenge, the court rejected Grote’s argument that Bruen‘s historical-tradition test undermines § 922(g)(1). The court observed that colonial-era law included at least eleven statutes restricting firearm possession by convicted felons or criminals predating ratification of the Constitution, and that both Heller and Bruen expressly left undisturbed longstanding prohibitions on felon possession. The court further held that Grote’s facial challenge was independently foreclosed by the Fifth Circuit’s decisions in United States v. Diaz (5th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Contreras (5th Cir. 2025).
Key Takeaways
- The felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), continues to withstand constitutional challenges in the Fifth Circuit on Commerce Clause, vagueness, and Second Amendment grounds.
- Post-Bruen facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) are foreclosed in the Fifth Circuit by United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Contreras, 125 F.4th 725 (5th Cir. 2025).
- The court grounded its Second Amendment analysis in colonial-era historical evidence of felon disarmament laws and in the explicit carve-outs for felon prohibitions found in both Heller and Bruen.
- Defendants who concede that circuit precedent forecloses their arguments preserve little prospect of district-court relief absent intervening Supreme Court authority.
Why It Matters
This ruling illustrates the continued durability of § 922(g)(1) in the post-Bruen landscape. Despite the Supreme Court’s shift to a history-and-tradition framework for Second Amendment analysis, district courts in the Fifth Circuit — and across the country — have largely upheld the felon-in-possession prohibition by pointing to the deep historical roots of disarming those deemed dangerous or untrustworthy, roots that predate the Constitution itself.
The decision also reflects the practical ceiling on pretrial constitutional motions where a defendant acknowledges that binding circuit precedent controls the outcome. Until the Supreme Court takes up a direct challenge to § 922(g)(1) in light of Bruen, district courts are bound to follow circuit authority, making dismissal on these grounds essentially unavailable absent a circuit split or new high-court guidance.