Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
L. C. Gipson participated in three armed robberies during one week in October 1992. A jury convicted him of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, substantive and attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and three counts of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Applying the law then in effect, the district court imposed consecutive terms of 60 months for the first firearm count and 240 months for each additional firearm count, producing a combined sentence of 750 months.
Congress later amended § 924(c) through the First Step Act so that its recidivism enhancement no longer applies to multiple convictions obtained in the same prosecution, but did not make that change retroactive. The Supreme Court also held in United States v. Taylor that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence capable of supporting a § 924(c) conviction. Relying on those developments, Gipson sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court denied relief, and he appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed. It held that Rutherford v. United States foreclosed Gipson’s reliance on the First Step Act’s nonretroactive amendment to § 924(c). Under Rutherford, the sentencing disparity created by that amendment cannot, by itself or together with other factors, constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release.
The court also held that Fernandez v. United States foreclosed Gipson’s reliance on Taylor. Although Gipson requested a sentence reduction rather than vacatur of his conviction, his argument depended on the claim that his attempted-Hobbs-Act-based § 924(c) conviction was invalid. Because the nature of the argument controls, that claim must be pursued, if at all, through a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 rather than compassionate release under § 3582.
Key Takeaways
- A nonretroactive change to § 924(c) cannot establish eligibility for compassionate release, whether considered alone or with other circumstances.
- A prisoner cannot use compassionate release to argue that a conviction became invalid under a later Supreme Court decision.
- The proper vehicle for a collateral attack on the validity of a federal conviction is a § 2255 motion, regardless of whether the prisoner requests a reduced sentence rather than vacatur.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the Supreme Court’s Rutherford and Fernandez rulings to sharply limit compassionate-release motions based on later changes in sentencing law or substantive challenges to convictions. Prisoners serving pre-First Step Act stacked § 924(c) sentences cannot treat the resulting disparity as an extraordinary and compelling reason for relief.
The ruling also reinforces the procedural boundary between compassionate release and habeas review: arguments that a conviction is legally invalid belong under § 2255, even when framed as requests to reduce the resulting sentence.