Reported / Citable
Background
A federal grand jury charged Michael Anthony Cecenas with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon on or about June 16, 2026, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(a)(8).
Cecenas moved before trial to dismiss Count One. He argued that § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on firearm possession by convicted felons exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause. He acknowledged that Fifth Circuit precedent foreclosed the argument.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Mark T. Pittman denied the motion to dismiss. Under Rule 12(b)(1), the court took the indictment’s allegations as true for purposes of the pretrial motion.
The court held that binding Fifth Circuit precedent establishes that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s commerce power. Although Cecenas noted that the Fifth Circuit had granted en banc review in another case involving a similar challenge, the district court remained bound by existing circuit precedent.
Key Takeaways
- Section 922(g)(1) remains constitutional under binding Fifth Circuit Commerce Clause precedent.
- A pending en banc proceeding does not displace controlling circuit authority.
- The felon-in-possession count will proceed.
Why It Matters
The order confirms that Commerce Clause challenges to § 922(g)(1) are unavailable in the Northern District of Texas unless and until binding Fifth Circuit or Supreme Court authority changes. Defendants may preserve such arguments, but district courts must apply controlling precedent.