Reported / Citable
Background
Jeremy Scott Allred was convicted in Texas state court in 2004 of assault causing bodily injury to a family member after pushing his wife during an argument and striking her in the face when she attempted to call 911. That assault qualified as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(a)(1).
Approximately two decades later, Allred was federally indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits firearm possession by anyone convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. Allred moved to dismiss the indictment, raising both a facial challenge under the Commerce Clause and an as-applied challenge under the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion. Allred then entered a guilty plea while reserving his right to appeal the constitutional questions, and was sentenced to 16 months in prison and three years of supervised release.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed Allred’s conviction on both constitutional grounds. On the Commerce Clause question, the court held that precedent established in United States v. Alcantar forecloses such challenges, and applied the same reasoning to § 922(g)(9) even though Alcantar addressed § 922(g)(1).
On the dispositive Second Amendment as-applied challenge, the court applied the Bruen test, which requires the government to justify firearm regulations by demonstrating consistency with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Analyzing both the “why” (rationale for the regulation) and the “how” (burden it imposes), the court found § 922(g)(9) constitutional. The “why”—disarming those who commit domestic violence—reflects Founding-era surety and “going armed” laws that targeted individuals posing physical threats to others. Citing United States v. Rahimi (2024), the court reasoned that historical governments disarmed classes of people deemed dangerous, and domestic violence misdemeanants fall within that category. The “how”—permanent disarmament—differs from temporary historical restrictions but satisfies Bruen because it imposes serious penalties only after judicial determination, and can be lifted through expungement, pardon, or restoration of civil rights.
The court rejected Allred’s argument that his conviction should not support disarmament because his assault could have involved merely reckless conduct. The court noted that Allred’s conduct involved intentionally employed force (swinging at his wife’s phone) that recklessly caused injury—conduct that both the Voisine majority and dissent agreed could support disarmament. The court concluded § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to misdemeanor domestic violence offenders generally, without requiring individualized assessment of dangerousness.
Key Takeaways
- 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), prohibiting firearm possession after a domestic violence misdemeanor conviction, is constitutional under both the Commerce Clause and the Second Amendment.
- Disarming domestic violence misdemeanants reflects a historical tradition of disarming those posing threats to others, supported by Founding-era surety and “going armed” laws.
- The Fifth Circuit’s categorical approach upholding the statute applies regardless of whether the underlying assault involved reckless or intentional conduct, provided the conduct involved intentionally employed force causing injury.
- This is the Fifth Circuit’s first post-Bruen decision addressing § 922(g)(9), and all six other circuits that have considered the question have reached the same conclusion.
Why It Matters
This decision resolves a gap in Second Amendment jurisprudence post-Bruen. Although the Supreme Court’s Rahimi decision addressed a parallel provision (§ 922(g)(8)(C)(i), barring firearm possession by those subject to domestic violence restraining orders), Allred is the Fifth Circuit’s first comprehensive analysis of § 922(g)(9). The court’s categorical approach—disarming all domestic violence misdemeanants without individualized dangerousness assessments—may influence other circuits still developing standards for as-applied challenges to felon-disarmament and related statutes, though Judge Graves’s concurrence signals internal disagreement on this methodology.
The decision has immediate significance for federal prosecutions under § 922(g)(9) and offers guidance to district courts handling similar as-applied challenges. It also reinforces the Rahimi framework’s extension to convictions (as opposed to civil restraining orders) as a basis for disarmament consistent with historical tradition, though circuit splits persist on whether individualized assessments should inform as-applied challenges in the broader § 922(g)(1) felon-disarmament context.