Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
On New Year’s Day 2021, Appellant Hoang Thanh Trinh, a family friend staying with D.P.’s grandmother in Amarillo, sexually abused D.P., a 10-year-old child. While other adults were away—the grandmother at work and D.P.’s father at a hotel—Trinh entered the bedroom where D.P. and her younger brother slept. D.P. testified that Trinh hugged and pulled her close, lifted her shirt, and fondled and licked her breasts. He then pulled down her shorts and underwear, licked her genitals, and manipulated her with his fingers. When D.P. refused his attempts to force her hand into his pants, he tried to place his tongue in her mouth, and D.P. smelled strong alcohol on his breath.
D.P.’s eldest brother was still awake and heard her account of the abuse. The next morning, she told her grandmother, who—fearing consequences—advised her to remain silent. When the family returned to Dallas, D.P. eventually disclosed the abuse to her parents. The matter was not reported to authorities until D.P. told a friend, who reported it to child protective services.
Trinh was indicted on three counts: aggravated sexual assault of a child and two counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact. He pleaded not guilty. A jury convicted him on all counts and assessed punishment at 30 years imprisonment for aggravated sexual assault and 5 years each for the two indecency counts, with the latter two sentences running concurrently but consecutive to the first. Trinh appealed, challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and fee assessments in the judgment.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed Trinh’s convictions, finding that the evidence was constitutionally sufficient under the Jackson v. Virginia standard. D.P.’s detailed testimony alone—without medical or physical corroboration—was sufficient to support conviction on all three counts. Texas law permits conviction for child sexual abuse based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a child victim. The court gave “wide latitude” to D.P.’s account given her young age, holding that the victim’s description need not be precise and the child is not expected to communicate with adult sophistication. While Trinh highlighted alleged inconsistencies in D.P.’s testimony concerning body positioning and timing, the jury was entitled to resolve these conflicts in D.P.’s favor, and the appellate court deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations.
As to the mens rea (guilty intent) element, Trinh’s conduct and the circumstances demonstrated sufficient evidence of criminal purpose. He waited until the grandmother left for work and the father left the house, kept the lights off, and remained quiet. When D.P. attempted to distance herself after using the bathroom, he pulled her back. His deployment of multiple methods of touching and his attempt to grab D.P. as she tried to leave further evidenced his guilty intent.
The court also agreed with Trinh’s second issue and modified the judgment by deleting $10,350 in court-appointed attorney’s fees and a $15 time payment fee. Although the trial court had determined Trinh to be indigent, the Bill of Costs improperly assessed attorney’s fees without record evidence that Trinh possessed financial resources to pay. Under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure § 26.05(g), such fees cannot be ordered absent a showing of the defendant’s ability to pay. Additionally, the time payment fee was premature while the appeal was pending and was properly removed.
Key Takeaways
- A child’s uncorroborated testimony is sufficient under Texas law to support conviction for sexual abuse; medical or physical evidence is not required.
- Trial courts must defer to jurors as the sole judges of witness credibility; appellate courts will not substitute their judgment for reasonable jury inferences from testimony.
- Courts give “wide latitude” to child sexual abuse victims’ testimony, allowing for imprecision in description and detail that would not be tolerated from adult witnesses.
- Court-appointed attorney’s fees may not be assessed against an indigent defendant absent record evidence demonstrating the defendant’s financial resources to pay.
- Time payment fees are premature and must be deleted while an appeal is pending.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces established Texas law that protects child sexual abuse victims by permitting conviction based solely on their testimony, without requiring corroborating physical evidence. This is particularly significant given the common evidentiary challenges in child sexual abuse cases, where medical evidence may be minimal or absent. The court’s affirmation of the conviction despite Trinh’s arguments about inconsistencies in D.P.’s testimony demonstrates that juries—not appellate courts—determine witness credibility and have broad discretion to resolve factual disputes in a child victim’s favor.
The case also clarifies important procedural protections for indigent defendants. By deleting the improper attorney’s fees assessment, the court reinforced that a defendant’s indigency status cannot be overcome by a trial court’s unilateral determination to charge fees without documented evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay. This protects defendants from being saddled with debt for legal representation they could not afford, a principle that serves both individual fairness and the integrity of the criminal justice system.