Reported / Citable
Background
Kevin Jose Rincones Escalante, a pro se petitioner, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 6, 2026, challenging his detention by immigration authorities. He acknowledged unlawful entry into the United States but contended that his continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights. He argued that several factors distinguished his case: he had surrendered voluntarily to authorities upon entry, had been released under an order of supervision by a prior administration, had no criminal history, posed no danger to the community, and had immigration proceedings still pending.
The court had previously flagged the Fifth Circuit’s controlling decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) subjects any individual present in the United States without lawful admission to mandatory detention as an “applicant for admission.” The court gave Petitioner an opportunity to identify individual circumstances or legal arguments that might warrant a different result, and Petitioner responded by contesting the applicability of that precedent to his situation.
Petitioner also claimed that his detention was causing him significant physical and emotional harm, and he sought to hold the current administration to the prior administration’s decision to release him under supervision rather than enforce mandatory detention against him.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Charles Eskridge denied the petition and dismissed the action with prejudice. On the statutory question, the court held that Buenrostro-Mendez is binding Fifth Circuit precedent that squarely forecloses Petitioner’s challenge: individuals present in the United States without lawful admission are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A), and a district court is bound by circuit precedent unless it is overruled by the en banc circuit or the Supreme Court. Petitioner’s disagreement with that precedent does not constitute a basis for habeas relief.
On the due process claims, the court held that procedural due process does not require an individualized custody determination beyond what § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates, and that pre-removal-order detention under the statute does not violate substantive due process even if it exceeds the six-month period recognized in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which governs post-removal-order detention. Because Petitioner’s removal order is not yet final, the Zadvydas presumptively constitutional period had not yet begun to run.
The court further held that the prior administration’s discretionary decision to release Petitioner under supervision does not estop the current administration from enforcing § 1225(b)(2)(A). Courts apply equitable estoppel against the government only in rare circumstances, and no statute, regulation, or constitutional principle required the government to follow specific procedural steps before exercising its full statutory authority. Finally, Petitioner’s claims of physical and emotional injury were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as conditions-of-confinement claims must be brought in a civil rights action, not a habeas petition.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi remains binding on district courts in the circuit: individuals present in the U.S. without lawful admission are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applicants for admission.
- A prior administration’s decision to release a noncitizen under supervision does not bind a subsequent administration or give rise to an equitable estoppel against enforcement of the mandatory detention statute.
- Substantive and procedural due process do not require an individualized bond hearing for individuals detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) during pre-removal-order proceedings; the Zadvydas six-month presumption applies only after a final order of removal.
- Conditions-of-confinement claims — including allegations of physical and emotional harm from detention — must be raised in a civil rights action and are outside the jurisdiction of a habeas court.
Why It Matters
This decision is one of a growing line of Southern District of Texas rulings applying Buenrostro-Mendez to shut down habeas challenges to immigration detention brought by noncitizens who entered unlawfully and were previously tolerated under prior enforcement policies. For practitioners, the case crystallizes the current state of the law in the Fifth Circuit: mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) is constitutionally permissible during removal proceedings, and neither a prior release under supervision nor pending asylum claims provide a foothold for a due process challenge to detention itself.
The decision also draws a sharp line between habeas jurisdiction and civil rights actions, reinforcing that detainees who wish to challenge the conditions of their confinement — as opposed to the fact of confinement — must pursue a separate civil rights claim. Attorneys representing immigration detainees in the Fifth Circuit should account for these limitations when advising clients on available remedies and forum selection.