Reported / Citable
Background
Seydpouriya Salehi Rad, an Iranian national, was apprehended at the U.S. border on January 27, 2025. Due to Presidential Proclamation No. 10888, he was not given a credible fear screening but instead placed in Convention Against Torture (CAT) withholding-only proceedings. An immigration judge ordered his removal to Iran on May 9, 2025, after finding no applications for relief had been filed. Following a D.C. court ruling that the Presidential Proclamation violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the government conducted a credible fear interview on September 28, 2025, determined Rad lacked credible fear, and ordered his removal. An immigration judge affirmed this determination on September 29, 2025.
Rad filed a habeas corpus petition on January 16, 2026. By the time of the hearing on May 18, 2026, he had been detained for approximately 17 months overall and more than nine months since his final removal order became effective. At the hearing, government counsel conceded that: (1) more than six months had elapsed since the removal order became final; (2) Rad had no criminal history or background justifying confinement; (3) there was no likelihood of removal to Iran in the reasonably foreseeable future due to ongoing conflict; and (4) no third country was willing to accept Iranian citizens.
The government argued that Rad’s detention was authorized under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), the expedited removal statute, and that standard time limitations and Zadvydas framework did not apply. Rad argued he was detained under § 1231(a)(6), which incorporates the Zadvydas constitutional limits on indefinite detention.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge found that Rad is detained under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) based on the statute’s plain language mandating detention “until removed” for those without credible fear. The court rejected Rad’s argument that detention authority shifted to § 1231(a)(6) upon entry of the removal order, finding this would conflict with statutory construction principles requiring effect be given to every clause. The court also rejected reliance on Jennings v. Rodriguez, finding that case addressed detention during ongoing proceedings for those with credible fear, not the post-removal detention of those without credible fear at issue here.
However, the court held that although specific time limitations from § 1231 and Zadvydas do not apply by statute to detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), aliens retain Fifth Amendment due process rights. The court rejected arguments that “entry fiction” doctrine or arriving alien status eliminates constitutional protections, emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment applies to all “persons” without distinction based on citizenship or immigration status. The court found that Rad’s continued detention—which no longer bears any relation to the statute’s purpose of facilitating expedited removal—violates the Due Process Clause. Because removal to Iran is not reasonably foreseeable, Rad has no criminal history, and the government conceded no third country will accept him, detention has become prolonged and arbitrary. The court recommended conditional release rather than a bond hearing, as the substantive due process component bars such arbitrary detention regardless of procedural protections.
Key Takeaways
- Even mandatory detention statutes with plain language prohibiting bail do not insulate indefinite detention from constitutional due process review when removal is not reasonably foreseeable.
- Aliens retain full Fifth Amendment due process protections regardless of immigration status, entry status, or application of entry fiction doctrine; these protections apply to the duration and arbitrariness of detention itself, distinct from immigration-related rights.
- Where statutory detention purposes become impossible to achieve—here, expedited removal when the home country cannot accept returns and no alternatives exist—detention becomes unconstitutionally arbitrary regardless of statutory authorization.
- The Zadvydas analytical framework limiting detention to periods reasonably necessary for removal applies as a constitutional matter even where statutory time limits do not explicitly govern.
Why It Matters
This decision significantly constrains the government’s ability to detain immigrants indefinitely under expedited removal procedures, even where statutes use mandatory language permitting indefinite detention. It holds that constitutional protections override plain statutory language when detention ceases to serve its intended purpose. For detainees from nations with whom the U.S. has conflicts or who cannot be removed due to diplomatic circumstances, this creates a constitutional floor: detention cannot continue indefinitely once removal becomes practically impossible. The decision is particularly significant because it rejects a narrow reading of Jennings v. Rodriguez and applies substantive due process limits to § 1225 detention, demonstrating that even broad statutory detention authority must bend to constitutional liberty protections.
The case affirms that immigration status and entry status do not eliminate core constitutional protections from arbitrary detention. It also suggests courts should critically examine whether detention authority remains tied to its statutory purpose when external circumstances (diplomatic relations, third-country acceptance policies) make removal impossible, rather than mechanically applying detention statutes in changed circumstances.