Reported / Citable
Background
Petitioner Aldrie Quintas, a native and citizen of the Philippines, was lawfully admitted to the U.S. in 1997. After being convicted of deportable crimes, he was placed into removal proceedings. An immigration judge ordered him deportable in 2004 but deferred removal under the Convention Against Torture. He was released on an order of supervision but later re-detained by ICE in September 2025 to carry out his removal to a third country.
Quintas subsequently filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting that his prolonged detention violated the Due Process Clause, citing Zadvydas v. Davis. His petition contained sparse allegations, stating only that “Philippines will not accept since 1990 and no 3rd country will accept me; in theory ICE will claim it, but in practice it’s impossible.” The Government responded, indicating that attempts to execute his removal were ongoing with the State Department but provided no new information or clear assessment of the likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Quintas did not file a reply.
The Court’s Holding
The U.S. District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, denied Aldrie Quintas’s habeas petition without prejudice. The court recognized that Quintas is subject to a valid and final order of removal and detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231. Under the precedent set by Zadvydas v. Davis, detention beyond the 90-day removal period is permissible only for a period reasonably necessary to secure the alien’s removal. After six months, if the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must present rebutting evidence.
However, the court found that Quintas failed to meet his initial burden under Zadvydas. His allegations regarding the unlikelihood of his removal were deemed conclusory and insufficient. Citing established precedent, the court reiterated that petitioners must provide more than vague, generalized statements to demonstrate that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Because Quintas did not offer non-conclusory facts or arguments to support his claim, he was not entitled to habeas relief at this stage. The denial was issued “without prejudice,” meaning Quintas has the opportunity to file objections to the recommendation and, if he can make a proper showing, could compel the court to seek supplemental briefing from the Government.
Key Takeaways
- Habeas corpus petitioners challenging prolonged immigration detention must meet the *Zadvydas* standard, requiring “good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”
- Conclusory allegations alone are insufficient to meet this burden; petitioners must provide specific, non-conclusory facts and arguments.
- A denial “without prejudice” in this context allows the petitioner to refine their claims and provide sufficient evidence in a subsequent filing or objection.
Why It Matters
This case serves as a crucial reminder for attorneys representing clients in prolonged immigration detention cases: the initial burden of proof to demonstrate the unlikelihood of removal rests firmly with the petitioner. Conclusory statements, however earnestly made, are insufficient to meet the stringent evidentiary standards required by Zadvydas v. Davis and its progeny. Practitioners must diligently gather and present specific, non-conclusory facts and arguments detailing the particular individual barriers to their client’s repatriation to their country of origin or a third country. While a denial without prejudice offers a chance to refine the arguments, it underscores the need for thorough preparation from the outset to effectively challenge indefinite detention under the Due Process Clause.