Texas Case Summaries
Federal Enforcement »

Parra Angulo v. Mullin — denied habeas relief to Cuban national held without bond during removal proceedings

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Julio Parra Angulo v. Markwayne Mullin, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security; David J. Venturella, in His Official Capacity as Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; Mary De Anda-Ybarra, in Her Official Capacity as Lead of the El Paso Field Office of ICE, Enforcement and Removal Operations; Warden of the El Paso Processing Center; and Sirce E. Owen, in His Official Capacity as Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review
Court
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division
Judge
Leon Schydlower
Date Decided
October 21, 2026
Docket No.
3:26-cv-02211-LS
Topics
Immigration Detention; Habeas Corpus; Due Process; Equal Protection

Background

Julio Parra Angulo, a Cuban citizen in removal proceedings, petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while detained at the El Paso Processing Center. He had no final order of removal and sought release from immigration custody or a bond hearing.

Parra Angulo challenged his detention under the immigration statutes, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process and equal-protection guarantees, and the Administrative Procedure Act or the rule of United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy. The district court had jurisdiction to consider his challenge to pre-removal-order detention.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied the petition. Applying the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, it held that Parra Angulo was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), rather than discretionary detention under § 1226(a), because he had not shown that he was clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission. He therefore had no statutory right to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).

The court also rejected his constitutional and administrative-law theories. His detention was not indefinite or potentially permanent because it would end when removal proceedings concluded, making detention without bond constitutionally permissible under Demore v. Kim. Because § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandated detention, there was no final unlawful agency action to review under the APA or Accardi. And § 1225 detainees were not similarly situated to § 1226 detainees; in any event, mandatory detention was rationally related to preventing applicants for admission from absconding.

Key Takeaways

  • Under binding Fifth Circuit precedent, a noncitizen who is not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission may be mandatorily detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A) during removal proceedings.
  • Pre-removal-order detention has a definite endpoint and is not unconstitutional merely because the detainee receives no bond hearing.
  • The court rejected the APA, Accardi, and equal-protection challenges because the statute mandated detention and the classification survived rational-basis review.

Why It Matters

The decision applies Buenrostro-Mendez to foreclose statutory bond-hearing claims by covered immigration detainees in Texas federal courts. It also treats detention lasting through ongoing removal proceedings as constitutionally distinct from the potentially indefinite post-removal-order detention addressed in Zadvydas v. Davis.

The court denied all pending motions as moot and directed the clerk to close the case.

Leave a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Scroll to Top