Reported / Citable
Background
Rickey McGee, a prisoner at the Polunsky Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, brought a pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Amindong.
Amindong moved for partial dismissal. Magistrate Judge Zack Hawthorn recommended dismissing the official-capacity constitutional claims but denying dismissal of McGee’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress and deliberate-indifference-to-medical-needs claims. Amindong objected to the recommendation as to the intentional-tort claim.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Marcia A. Crone partially adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The court granted partial dismissal of the official-capacity claims and dismissed McGee’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim.
Although Amindong had raised sovereign immunity only cursorily in his motion, he argued in his objections that the Texas Tort Claims Act required dismissal because the alleged conduct occurred within the scope of his employment, even though the Act does not waive immunity for intentional torts. The court found that objection meritorious. It denied dismissal of McGee’s claim that Amindong was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
Key Takeaways
- Official-capacity constitutional claims against Officer Amindong were dismissed.
- The intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim was dismissed under the Texas Tort Claims Act framework.
- The Section 1983 deliberate-indifference claim concerning serious medical needs remains pending.
Why It Matters
The order narrows the case to McGee’s individual-capacity federal medical-care claim. It also illustrates that, under the Texas Tort Claims Act, intentional-tort allegations arising from conduct within a government employee’s scope of employment may not supply a state-law damages remedy.