Reported / Citable
Background
Tahimi Romero Marzo, a Cuban citizen, entered the United States at a port of entry and was paroled into the country after being charged with removability. A year after her arrival, she applied for adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. She was subsequently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and on January 28, 2026, an immigration judge ordered her removed. Marzo appealed that removal order and remained in immigration custody pending the appeal.
Marzo filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that her detention without a bond hearing violated the Immigration and Nationality Act, substantive and procedural due process, and constituted ultra vires agency action. She contended she was being held under § 1226(a), which would entitle her to a bond hearing. The government moved for summary judgment, arguing she was properly subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2) as an applicant for admission.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment and denied the habeas petition in full. Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), the court held that because Marzo’s presence in the United States was without formal admission, she is deemed an applicant for admission and is therefore subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), not the discretionary detention regime of § 1226(a). Her ultra vires claim failed for the same reason — it depended on an interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226 that the Fifth Circuit had already rejected.
The court further held that detention without a bond hearing violated neither substantive nor procedural due process. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003), the court reaffirmed that detention during removal proceedings is constitutionally permissible. Because Marzo’s rights regarding admission are only those granted by statute, and because § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of admission applicants until specified proceedings conclude, she has no procedural due process entitlement to a bond hearing.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen paroled into the United States without formal admission is classified as an “applicant for admission” and is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), not the discretionary detention and bond-hearing framework of § 1226(a).
- The Fifth Circuit’s Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi (2026) forecloses arguments that paroled noncitizens are entitled to bond hearings under § 1226(a), and district courts in the Southern District of Texas are applying it broadly.
- Mandatory detention of admission applicants during removal proceedings satisfies both substantive and procedural due process under Demore v. Kim; no bond hearing is constitutionally required.
- Cuban Adjustment Act applicants who have not been formally admitted remain in the “applicant for admission” category for detention purposes and receive no special procedural protection beyond what the statute provides.
Why It Matters
This decision reflects a consistent line of rulings from the Southern District of Texas applying Buenrostro-Mendez to deny bond hearings to paroled noncitizens — including those, like Marzo, who arrived at a port of entry and applied for relief under the Cuban Adjustment Act. For immigration practitioners, the case underscores that the manner of entry and formal admission status are threshold determinants of which detention statute applies, effectively eliminating bond-hearing rights for a broad class of detained individuals.
As litigation over immigration detention standards continues to intensify nationally, decisions like this one illustrate how the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226 diverges from approaches taken in other circuits, creating significant circuit splits on the rights of detained noncitizens during removal proceedings.