Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jose Rolando Larena Labrada, a Cuban citizen, entered the United States without inspection on March 3, 2022. He was arrested by U.S. Customs and Border Protection on March 6, 2022, and served with a Notice to Appear charging him with removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) for entering without admission or parole. He was released on his own recognizance.
On January 20, 2026, Labrada was taken into Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody where he has remained. Dania Donate Marrero, acting as next-of-friend, filed a habeas petition on Labrada’s behalf arguing that detention without a bond hearing violates due process and that the warrant of arrest violates the Fourth Amendment. The respondent filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Marrero lacks standing as next-of-friend and that Labrada is lawfully detained as an applicant for admission under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
The Court’s Holding
The court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that Marrero failed to satisfy the three-part test established in Whitmore v. Arkansas, 110 S. Ct. 1717 (1990), for representing a party as next-of-friend. The court held that Marrero must: (1) provide adequate explanation why Labrada cannot appear on his own behalf, (2) establish dedication to his best interests, and (3) establish a significant relationship with him. Marrero failed to allege any of these required elements, and the record showed Labrada was capable of appearing on his own behalf, having previously filed his own habeas petition in this court.
Even if Marrero had satisfied the next-of-friend requirements, the court held Labrada’s claims would lack merit. The court found that because Labrada’s “presence without admission deems [him] to be [an] applicant[] for admission,” he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2). Citing Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003), the court held that detention during removal proceedings is constitutionally permissible and does not violate substantive or procedural due process. The court further held that Labrada is not entitled to a bond hearing as a matter of procedural due process because he only possesses those rights regarding admission that Congress has provided by statute, and § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention of applicants for admission.
The court rejected Labrada’s Fourth Amendment challenge, holding it was foreclosed because it relied on the assertion that the government lacks authority to detain him under § 1225.
Key Takeaways
- A next-of-friend filing a habeas petition must establish adequate explanation, dedication to the real party’s interests, and a significant relationship—failure to allege these elements deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
- Aliens who enter without inspection and are deemed applicants for admission are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), and such detention does not violate constitutional due process protections.
- Applicants for admission have only those procedural rights that Congress has statutorily provided; they are not entitled to bond hearings when § 1225(b)(2) mandates their detention.
- Fourth Amendment challenges to immigration detention are foreclosed when premised on assertions that the government lacks detention authority under the governing immigration statute.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces established Fifth Circuit precedent that aliens subject to removal proceedings who are deemed applicants for admission may be detained without bond hearings or satisfying traditional bail considerations. The ruling underscores that immigration detention is treated differently from criminal detention under constitutional law, with detainees afforded only those procedural protections Congress has explicitly provided by statute. For practitioners representing immigration clients, this decision confirms that statutory compliance (here, § 1225(b)(2)) provides the constitutional floor for detention authority.
The court’s emphasis on jurisdictional defects in the next-of-friend standing analysis also serves as a cautionary note: habeas petitions filed by representatives on behalf of detained immigrants must carefully establish the Whitmore requirements or face dismissal before reaching the merits. The court’s finding that Labrada had independently filed other litigation suggests courts may scrutinize next-of-friend representations when the purported incapacitated party demonstrates independent litigation capacity.