Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
On August 27, 2024, Alex Lee Jones visited the Tarrant County Corrections Center lobby to inquire about his brother’s detention. Captain Jennifer Renner and Lieutenant Jose Arroyo addressed his questions about his brother’s status. Jones became increasingly agitated, used profane language, and began filming the officers on his cell phone as they moved toward the secure door to the jail administration offices. Lieutenant Arroyo told Jones multiple times, “You need to leave.” Jones testified he believed he was “free to stay” and questioned whether Arroyo had authority to order him to depart. Physical contact ensued, with Jones claiming Arroyo grabbed him before he could leave, while Arroyo testified Jones lunged at him.
A jury acquitted Jones of resisting arrest but convicted him of criminal trespass. The trial court sentenced him to 45 days in the Tarrant County Jail. Jones appealed solely on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, arguing he was never given an opportunity to leave the premises.
The Court’s Holding
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Under Texas Penal Code § 30.05(a)(2), criminal trespass requires proof that a person remained on another’s property without effective consent and received notice to depart but failed to do so. The court agreed in principle that a person must be given an opportunity to leave when given notice, but found this principle inapplicable here because criminal trespass requires a “volitional refusal to leave,” not merely an inability to depart immediately.
The offense is complete at the moment of refusal, not when the person has fully left the premises. The law does not permit a person to remain after notice to leave “to finish saying or doing what the actor chooses to say or do, and leisurely depart.” Jones’s testimony that he was “free to stay” and his questioning of Arroyo’s authority to order him to leave constituted evidence of refusal. The court deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations regarding whether Jones’s actions and statements demonstrated a volitional refusal to depart and whether Arroyo’s conduct prevented him from leaving.
Key Takeaways
- Criminal trespass requires proof of a volitional refusal to leave, not merely a delay in departing or an inability to leave immediately upon command.
- A defendant’s statements questioning an officer’s authority to order departure and asserting he was “free to stay” can constitute evidence of refusal to leave.
- Jury credibility determinations regarding whether a defendant refused to leave are entitled to deference on appeal under the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard.
- The offense is complete at the moment of refusal, allowing no grace period for the defendant to “leisurely depart on his or her own terms.”
Why It Matters
This decision clarifies the mental element required for criminal trespass convictions in Texas. By holding that the offense hinges on volitional refusal rather than the physical act of departure, the court established that a defendant’s words and conduct—particularly statements questioning the lawfulness of an officer’s authority—can establish guilt even if the defendant’s departure would have been physically possible. This distinction is crucial for law enforcement and facility administrators who issue leave-or-be-arrested warnings.
The ruling also confirms that courts should not second-guess juries’ assessments of credibility when evaluating sufficiency of evidence, particularly on disputed factual questions such as whether a defendant intended to refuse an order or was genuinely prevented from complying. This broad deference to jury fact-finding applies even when the defendant presents a competing narrative about his willingness to leave.