Reported / Citable
Background
Texas prisoner Reginald Jones filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging that his parole was revoked without the due process required for a revocation hearing. He had previously raised the claim in state court.
The state court found that Jones received notice of his rights and alleged violations, signed a waiver of a revocation hearing, had each violation sustained, and received written notice of the decision. In the federal case, Jones sought a preliminary injunction requiring an immediate final revocation hearing within 20 days.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Sean D. Jordan adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, overruled Jones’s objections, and denied the requested preliminary injunction. Jones had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on his habeas claim under the deferential standards governing claims adjudicated on the merits in state court.
Due process requires an opportunity for a parole revocation hearing if the parolee wants one, but that right may be waived. Jones did not dispute signing a written waiver that said he did not want a hearing, disclaimed coercion, and stated that no promises by the parole officer controlled the outcome. His unsupported assertion that he had been coerced did not show that the state court’s decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. He also failed to address the other preliminary-injunction factors.
Key Takeaways
- A parolee may waive the due process right to a final revocation hearing.
- A signed waiver disclaiming coercion and unauthorized promises undermined Jones’s request for emergency relief.
- Failure to establish likelihood of success on the merits is fatal to a preliminary-injunction request.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the substantial hurdle facing state prisoners seeking interim relief in federal habeas cases after a state court has rejected the underlying claim. A conclusory allegation of coercion will not overcome a state-court finding that a parolee knowingly waived a revocation hearing, particularly where the written waiver expressly disclaims coercion and promises.