Reported / Citable
Background
Siavash J., an Iranian national, entered the United States on January 19, 2025, and is currently detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement at Port Isabel Detention Center in Cameron County, Texas. An Immigration Judge issued a removal order on June 30, 2025. Petitioner appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which denied the appeal on May 21, 2026—approximately one year later. Following the BIA’s decision, the removal order became administratively final on that same date, triggering the statutory removal period authorizing mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.
Petitioner filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging the constitutionality of his detention as indefinite and arguing there was no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Government responded with a Motion for Summary Judgment defending the legality of detention during removal proceedings. The Magistrate Judge liberally construed Petitioner’s claims as a challenge under the framework established in Zadvydas v. Davis.
The Court’s Holding
The Magistrate Judge recommended denying the habeas petition and dismissing the Government’s Motion for Summary Judgment as moot based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court found the petition premature under the doctrine of ripeness. The court applied the two-phase framework from Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which authorizes detention in two periods: (1) a first six-month period after a final removal order becomes effective during which detention is presumptively constitutional and statutory challenges are not viable; and (2) a period thereafter during which detention may be challenged if the petitioner demonstrates there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
The court determined that Petitioner’s removal order became final on May 21, 2026, and at the time of the petition in late June 2026, he was only approximately one month into the initial six-month period of presumptively valid detention. Accordingly, his constitutional challenge to prolonged detention was not yet ripe for adjudication. The court noted that the petition could be refiled once the claims became ripe after the six-month period elapsed. The court distinguished between claims challenging detention during the mandatory 90-day removal period (which are barred by § 1231(a)(2)) and post-removal-period claims that must wait until after six months have passed.
Key Takeaways
- Habeas challenges to detention following a final removal order are not ripe during the first six months after the order becomes administratively final, when detention is presumptively constitutional under Zadvydas.
- A removal order becomes administratively final upon BIA affirmance or expiration of the period to seek BIA review.
- Petitioners may refile habeas petitions after the six-month period expires if they can demonstrate no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.
- Lack of ripeness is a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal, though dismissal is without prejudice, permitting future filings.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the Zadvydas framework’s application in the Fifth Circuit and establishes that immigration detainees cannot challenge detention immediately after a removal order becomes final. The court’s strict adherence to the six-month presumptively reasonable period means detainees seeking release must wait before filing habeas petitions, even if they argue detention is unconstitutionally prolonged. The opinion acknowledges tension among district courts within the Fifth Circuit regarding Zadvydas’s precise application but follows the majority approach requiring premature dismissal.
For immigration practitioners, the decision clarifies that post-finality detention challenges must be strategically timed after the six-month window and requires evidence that removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable. The decision also notes that if a petitioner’s attempt to stay removal is successful in the Fifth Circuit, the removal period commencement date may be delayed, potentially affecting the six-month calculation.