Reported / Citable
Background
Marc Anthony Hill was convicted in 2019 after a ten-day federal jury trial arising from a violent armored-car robbery scheme in Houston. Hill and co-defendants identified ATM locations where armored car drivers would replenish cash, then robbed the drivers at the moment of delivery. During the first robbery at a Wells Fargo ATM, the armored car driver was murdered. Law enforcement surveillance foiled a second attempt at an Amegy Bank ATM, and Hill was arrested at the scene. A jury found him guilty on all four counts: aiding and abetting Hobbs Act robbery, aiding and abetting use of a firearm during a crime of violence causing death, attempted Hobbs Act robbery, and aiding and abetting discharge of a firearm during a crime of violence.
The district court sentenced Hill to two concurrent 240-month terms on Counts One and Three, followed by two consecutive life sentences on Counts Two and Four. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated Count Four for all defendants under the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Taylor (2022), which established that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence. Hill’s remaining convictions and sentences stood. In May 2024, Hill filed a pro se motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asserting three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. He later filed a supplemental omnibus motion in August 2025 raising an additional claim.
The government moved for summary judgment, arguing Hill’s ineffective-assistance claims were speculative and conclusory. Judge David Hittner presided over the post-conviction proceedings.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied all of Hill’s claims and granted the government’s motion for summary judgment. On Claim One — that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain a Daubert hearing on voice-identification expert Marisa Dery — the court found no deficiency or prejudice under Strickland v. Washington. The record showed counsel had vigorously litigated the issue: filing a proposed expert witness list, responding at length to the government’s exclusion motion, and explicitly requesting a Rule 702 hearing. The court had nonetheless excluded the testimony as failing the Daubert standard, and the government stood ready with a rebuttal expert. Hill’s claim amounted to an attempt to relitigate the exclusion ruling by blaming his attorney.
On Claim Two — that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Hill’s exclusion from an in camera hearing regarding a confidential informant — the court held that no constitutional violation occurred. Fifth Circuit precedent under United States v. De Los Santos (5th Cir. 1987) squarely provides that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not violated by in camera proceedings to determine whether disclosure of an informant’s identity would benefit the defense. Counsel cannot be deficient for failing to make a futile objection. Claim Three, that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising Claims One and Two on appeal, failed for the same reasons: the underlying claims lacked merit, and appellate counsel is not required to raise every nonfrivolous argument — notably, appellate counsel had already secured a partial victory by obtaining vacatur of Count Four.
The court also dismissed Hill’s August 2025 supplemental omnibus motion as untimely. The amended final judgment was entered May 2, 2023, starting the one-year AEDPA limitations period. Hill filed the supplemental motion more than fifteen months later, well outside that window. The court further denied a certificate of appealability, finding no reasonable jurist could debate its resolution of the claims.
Key Takeaways
- Vigorous but unsuccessful litigation of an evidentiary issue at trial does not establish deficient performance under Strickland; a petitioner cannot reframe a lost pre-trial ruling as ineffective assistance by pointing to the outcome alone.
- Trial counsel is not constitutionally required to object to in camera informant-disclosure hearings from which the defendant is excluded — Fifth Circuit precedent forecloses such a Sixth Amendment claim, making any objection futile and therefore not a basis for ineffective-assistance relief.
- Appellate counsel’s failure to raise meritless claims does not constitute ineffective assistance, particularly where counsel secured a meaningful partial victory on appeal (vacatur of Count Four).
- AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations for § 2255 motions runs from the date the judgment of conviction becomes final; supplemental motions filed well outside that window will be dismissed as untimely regardless of their merits.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates the high bar petitioners face when challenging convictions through § 2255 claims of ineffective assistance. Courts will scrutinize the actual trial record to determine whether counsel genuinely failed to advocate — not merely whether advocacy succeeded. Where counsel researched, briefed, and argued a contested issue and lost on the merits, blame cannot simply be shifted to the attorney on collateral review.
The ruling also underscores the jurisdictional significance of AEDPA’s one-year deadline. Prisoners who file supplemental § 2255 motions raising new claims must ensure those claims relate back to timely-filed pleadings or independently satisfy the limitations period; tardy filings will be dismissed at the threshold without reaching the merits, no matter how substantive the underlying argument.