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Hernandez Solis v. Mullin — Federal court orders immediate release of 18-year Texas resident detained without bond hearing

Reported / Citable

Case
Braulio Hernandez Solis v. Markwayne Mullin, in his official capacity as Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court, Western District of Texas, Austin Division
Date Decided
June 2, 2026
Docket No.
1:26-CV-1337-RP
Topics
Immigration detention, Habeas corpus, Due process, Bond hearings

Background

Braulio Hernandez Solis, a Mexican citizen, entered the United States without inspection in approximately 2008 and lived in the Austin, Texas area for roughly eighteen years. His parents are lawful permanent residents, and he has four U.S. citizen children. On May 12, 2026, ICE detained him following a traffic stop and served him with a Notice to Appear. He was held at the T. Don Hutto Detention Center in Taylor, Texas with removal proceedings pending.

The government classified Hernandez Solis as an “applicant for admission” subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)—a statutory provision the Fifth Circuit had recently upheld as applicable to long-term undocumented residents in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026). Under the government’s interpretation, neither ICE nor an immigration judge could conduct a bond hearing. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on May 19, 2026, arguing that detention without any individualized assessment violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The court ordered respondents to show cause within three days. Respondents opposed the petition, arguing in part that Petitioner had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, that DHS v. Thuraissigiam foreclosed his due process claims, and that no procedural due process right to a bond hearing exists under § 1225(b)(2).

The Court’s Holding

Judge Robert Pitman granted the petition, holding that detaining Hernandez Solis under § 1225(b)(2) without any bond hearing violated his Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process. The court acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez resolved the statutory question against petitioner, but found that Buenrostro-Mendez expressly did not reach any constitutional due process challenge—leaving the constitutional question open for independent analysis.

Applying the three-part balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the court found all three factors favored Petitioner. His approximately eighteen years of residence in the United States created a substantial liberty interest; detention without any individualized hearing created a high risk of erroneous deprivation; and the government’s interest in ensuring appearance at removal proceedings could be fully addressed at a bond hearing—a process the government itself conducted for decades before its recent reinterpretation of § 1225(b). The court further rejected the government’s reliance on Thuraissigiam, finding Petitioner distinguishable because he did not challenge the admission process and had lived freely in the country for nearly two decades, placing him squarely within the due process protections that attach to persons present in the United States.

The court ordered Petitioner’s immediate release, enjoined further detention without a bond hearing, and placed the burden on the government to justify any re-detention by clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness or flight risk. Respondents were also ordered to file a compliance status report by June 4, 2026.

Key Takeaways

  • The Fifth Circuit’s Buenrostro-Mendez decision—holding that § 1225(b)(2) applies to long-term undocumented residents—does not foreclose independent Fifth Amendment due process challenges, because that ruling addressed only statutory interpretation.
  • Under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, an undocumented noncitizen who has lived in the United States for approximately eighteen years has a cognizable liberty interest sufficient to require an individualized bond hearing before prolonged civil detention.
  • The label “mandatory detention” under § 1225(b)(2) is in the court’s view a misnomer, because those detainees remain eligible for parole on humanitarian grounds, making flight-risk and dangerousness determinations legally relevant and a bond hearing constitutionally required.
  • Where detention is found unlawful, the appropriate remedy is immediate release rather than a mere remand for a bond hearing, because the pre-deprivation constitutional violation has already occurred.

Why It Matters

This decision is part of a growing body of federal district court rulings across Texas—and nationally—holding that the government’s post-2025 policy of applying § 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention to long-term undocumented residents without any bond hearing is unconstitutionally deficient under the Fifth Amendment, notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit’s contrary statutory ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez. By grounding relief in the Constitution rather than the statute, district courts have effectively preserved an independent avenue for release even after the appellate court closed the statutory door.

For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of pleading both statutory and constitutional grounds in § 1225(b)(2) habeas petitions. It also signals that courts will scrutinize the length of a detainee’s prior U.S. residency as a key factor in the Mathews analysis, and that the government bears a heavy burden—clear and convincing evidence—to justify continued detention at any subsequent bond hearing ordered by a federal court.

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