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Dabrowska v. Tate — Court denied immigration detainee’s habeas petition as premature or beyond its review

Reported / Citable

Case
Paulina Dabrowska v. Randy Tate
Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division
Judge
Charles Eskridge
Date Decided
October 28, 2026
Docket No.
4:26-cv-09093
Topics
Immigration Detention; Habeas Corpus; Removal Proceedings

Background

Paulina Dabrowska, proceeding pro se, petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after immigration officials detained her on August 21, 2026. She alleged that she had been a lawful permanent resident since 1997 and that her detention was unlawful.

An immigration court found Dabrowska inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) based on a November 2025 guilty plea to a controlled-substance violation, for which she received three years’ deferred adjudication. The deadline to appeal the removal order was August 10, 2026. Dabrowska asserted that she timely mailed a notice of appeal that was never docketed and that she intended to seek reopening of her appeal.

The Court’s Holding

The court denied the petition and dismissed the action with prejudice because the petition showed that Dabrowska was not entitled to habeas relief under either possible basis for her detention. If the removal order became final when the appeal deadline expired, she was detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). Her approximately two months of detention fell within the six-month period that is presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas v. Davis, making a challenge to continued post-removal-order detention premature.

If Dabrowska’s asserted appeal meant that the removal order was not final, the court concluded that her detention instead proceeded under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). Because the immigration court had found her inadmissible under § 1182(a)(2), § 1226(c) required detention pending a decision on removal, subject to the statute’s limited exception. The court said her disagreement with the inadmissibility finding was a matter for appeal and that § 1226(e) deprived it of jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s detention decision.

Key Takeaways

  • Approximately two months of post-removal-order detention was presumptively reasonable under Zadvydas, so a challenge to continued detention was premature.
  • If Dabrowska’s removal appeal remained pending, § 1226(c) governed and required detention based on the immigration court’s inadmissibility finding.
  • The district court treated Dabrowska’s challenge to the underlying inadmissibility determination as an issue for immigration appellate proceedings, not habeas review in this action.

Why It Matters

The decision illustrates that uncertainty over the finality of a removal order does not necessarily establish entitlement to habeas relief. Here, the court concluded that neither potential detention framework supported relief: detention under § 1231(a)(6) had not exceeded the presumptively reasonable period, while detention under § 1226(c) was mandatory on the petition’s allegations and not reviewable as a discretionary detention decision.

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