Reported / Citable
Background
Orlando Vega Alfonso, a Cuban national detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement since October 8, 2025, filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. An immigration judge ordered his removal on February 9, 2026, but his appeal of that order remained pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Alfonso argued that his detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and the Fifth Amendment under Zadvydas v. Davis because the 90-day removal period had passed and his removal was not reasonably foreseeable. He sought release from ICE custody or a bond hearing. He also briefly described allegedly inadequate conditions at the detention center.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge R. Rutherford recommended that the district judge summarily dismiss the habeas petition without prejudice as premature. Section 1231 and the Zadvydas framework govern detention following a final removal order, but Alfonso’s removal order was not final because his timely BIA appeal remained pending.
Because the statutory removal period had not begun, Alfonso could not yet maintain a Zadvydas challenge to post-removal-order detention. The magistrate judge also explained that Alfonso’s complaints about overcrowding, food, bedding, and medical care concerned conditions of confinement and therefore must be pursued, if at all, in a separate civil-rights action rather than through habeas corpus.
Key Takeaways
- A removal order is not final for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1231 while a timely BIA appeal remains pending.
- A Zadvydas challenge to prolonged post-removal-order detention is premature before the removal order becomes final and the applicable detention period elapses.
- Claims challenging immigration-detention conditions generally must be brought in a separate civil-rights action, not a habeas petition.
Why It Matters
The recommendation underscores that the statutory basis and timing of immigration detention determine whether a noncitizen may invoke Zadvydas. A detainee cannot calculate the post-removal detention period from an immigration judge’s decision while administrative review remains pending.
It also reinforces the procedural distinction between challenges to the legality or duration of custody, which may sound in habeas, and challenges to confinement conditions, which require a civil-rights action.