Reported / Citable
Background
Petitioner Eblin Alsides Acosta Guerrero, a Honduran citizen, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 while detained during removal proceedings before any final order of removal was entered. He challenged his mandatory detention without a bond hearing, arguing that continued confinement violated his rights under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection guarantee, and the Administrative Procedure Act. The case was one of more than 400 similar habeas petitions filed in the Western District of Texas arising from immigration custody disputes.
The government detained Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention for noncitizens who are applicants for admission and are not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” Petitioner argued he was entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which governs detention of aliens already admitted but later found deportable and which permits individualized bond determinations.
The legal landscape shifted significantly on February 6, 2026, when the Fifth Circuit issued Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which reversed district court orders granting bond hearings to similarly situated pre-removal-order detainees and held that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention for applicants for admission during removal proceedings.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied the habeas petition in full. Applying Buenrostro-Mendez as binding Fifth Circuit precedent, the court held that Petitioner’s mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) — without a bond hearing — does not violate the Constitution or federal law. Because Petitioner was not “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted,” the statute compelled his detention and foreclosed any claim that he was entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a).
On the due process claim, the court relied on Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), to distinguish constitutionally problematic indefinite post-removal-order detention from pre-removal-order detention. Because Petitioner’s detention has a “definite termination point” — either removal after a final order or release if no removal order issues — it is neither indefinite nor potentially permanent, and therefore does not offend due process.
The court also rejected Petitioner’s APA and Accardi claims, finding no unlawful agency action to review because the statute itself mandates detention. On equal protection, the court found that § 1225 detainees (applicants for admission, whose unauthorized entry is a criminal offense) are not similarly situated to § 1226 detainees (admitted aliens who overstayed, a civil offense), and that mandatory detention is rationally related to the legitimate government interest in preventing abscondment during removal proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), is now controlling authority in the Fifth Circuit and forecloses § 2241 habeas claims seeking bond hearings for pre-removal-order detainees held under § 1225(b)(2)(A).
- Pre-removal-order immigration detention does not violate due process because it has a definite termination point — unlike the post-removal-order indefinite detention found unconstitutional in Zadvydas.
- § 1225 detainees (applicants for admission) and § 1226 detainees (admitted aliens subject to removal) are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes, making differential treatment between the two groups subject only to rational-basis review — which mandatory detention easily satisfies.
- APA challenges to mandatory immigration detention fail where a statute, rather than agency discretion, commands the detention.
Why It Matters
This decision illustrates how Buenrostro-Mendez is rapidly reshaping immigration habeas litigation across the Fifth Circuit. With more than 400 similar petitions pending in the Western District of Texas alone, the ruling signals a categorical bar to bond-hearing claims by § 1225 detainees — a population that includes a large share of those apprehended at or near the southern border — regardless of how long removal proceedings last.
For practitioners, the opinion maps the full doctrinal landscape governing pre-removal-order detention: the statutory distinction between § 1225 and § 1226, the constitutional limits set by Zadvydas and Demore, and the rational-basis framework that shields the detention scheme from equal protection attack. Attorneys representing detained noncitizens in the Fifth Circuit will need to confront Buenrostro-Mendez directly, and may need to preserve arguments for further review if detention becomes prolonged enough to raise a distinct, fact-specific due process challenge.