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McElhinny v. Collier — Magistrate judge recommends dismissing federal parole-related due process claims

Reported / Citable

Case
Demian McElhinny v. Bryan Collier, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division
Judge
Julie K. Hampton
Date Decided
December 2, 2025
Docket No.
2:25-CV-00216
Topics
Prisoner Civil Rights, Parole, Due Process, Good-Time Credits

Background

Texas prisoner Demian McElhinny filed a pro se civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against TDCJ Executive Director Bryan Collier, the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, parole officer Steve Quinones, and McConnell Unit Warden Amonette. McElhinny, who was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and possession of a controlled substance, became eligible for parole in June 2024 and was denied parole in August 2024.

McElhinny alleged that officials denied him meaningful participation in the parole process, refused him access to his parole file, may have relied on erroneous information, and improperly discounted good-time or inmate-treatment-program credits. He sought declarations limiting the executive branch’s discretion over parole and injunctions governing parole criteria, file access, and program placement. He also asserted claims under the Texas Constitution’s due process and separation-of-powers provisions.

The Court’s Holding

In a memorandum and recommendation issued during screening under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Magistrate Judge Julie K. Hampton concluded that McElhinny’s federal due process claims should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim. Although his request for expedited parole consideration could proceed as a § 1983 claim rather than habeas corpus because success would not automatically require his release, the allegations did not establish a protected liberty interest.

The magistrate judge explained that Texas parole is discretionary and creates no constitutionally protected expectation of release or entitlement to particular parole procedures. Because McElhinny’s aggravated-sexual-assault conviction makes him ineligible for mandatory supervision, he also lacks a protected liberty interest in good-time credits. Article 37.07, § 4(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure did not create such an interest, and alleged reliance on false or unreliable parole information did not independently establish a federal due process violation.

The magistrate judge further recommended declining supplemental jurisdiction over the related Texas-law claims after dismissal of all federal claims. She also recommended that the dismissal count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Key Takeaways

  • Texas prisoners have no federally protected liberty interest in discretionary parole or in the procedures used to make parole decisions.
  • A Texas inmate who is ineligible for mandatory supervision has no protected liberty interest in accrued good-time credits.
  • The ruling was a magistrate judge’s recommendation, not a final judgment, and the parties had 14 days to object.

Why It Matters

The recommendation applies settled Fifth Circuit principles to foreclose federal due process challenges to Texas parole procedures when the prisoner lacks a protected liberty interest in parole or mandatory-supervision release. It also illustrates that characterizing parole-related allegations as a § 1983 action does not make them viable on the merits.

If adopted by the district court, the recommendation would end McElhinny’s federal claims with prejudice, leave his state-law theories outside the federal case, and impose a Prison Litigation Reform Act strike.

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