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Granado v. EPISD — Dismissed claims for racial discrimination in school athletics; school district immune from tort claims, coach shielded by qualified immunity

Reported / Citable

Case
David Granado, individually and as next friend of S.G., a minor child, v. El Paso Independent School District, Andress High School, Eugene Costello, Ebbernoel Ruvalcava, and Does 1-5
Court
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, El Paso Division
Date Decided
July 6, 2026
Docket No.
3:25-cv-00504-LS
Topics
Racial discrimination, school athletics, Title VI, Equal Protection Clause, qualified immunity
Source
Read the full opinion

Background

Plaintiff David Granado sued on behalf of himself and his minor son S.G., alleging that Coach Eugene Costello at Andress High School discriminated against S.G. because of his race in basketball team selection and opportunities. Granado named as defendants EPISD, Andress High School, Coach Costello, Coach Ebbernoel Ruvalcava, and unknown defendants.

The allegations centered on Costello’s varsity basketball team decisions. Granado alleged that Costello promoted other students to varsity who had not attended summer practice, even though summer attendance was allegedly “a key factor” in selection, while S.G.—who had attended—was not promoted. Granado further alleged that Costello failed to communicate practice times to S.G., withheld private coaching and transportation offered to other players, made S.G. perform wall sits during a tryout hour, failed to provide him a team uniform (preventing participation in All-American National Team tryouts), and told S.G. he was “not there mentally” and “wasn’t worth minutes on the varsity bench.” A separate coach allegedly stated that S.G. was “the wrong color of skin.” Granado brought claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Equal Protection Clause, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and retaliation. Defendants moved to dismiss.

The Court’s Holding

The court granted the motion to dismiss with leave to amend. Andress High School was dismissed because Texas law does not grant individual schools capacity to sue or be sued as separate entities; only school districts have that capacity. EPISD’s Title VI claim was dismissed because Granado failed to plead that EPISD possessed an official discriminatory policy or that an appropriate person within EPISD with authority to take corrective measures had actual knowledge of discrimination and responded with deliberate indifference. The court found only that coaches knew of alleged discrimination, not EPISD decision-makers. EPISD’s § 1983 Equal Protection claim was dismissed because Granado did not allege either an official policy or a persistent, widespread practice of racial discrimination.

EPISD’s tort claims were dismissed under the Texas Tort Claims Act, which grants school districts immunity from tort liability except in cases involving motor vehicles. Coach Costello was dismissed from tort claims under state law: when suit names both a governmental unit and its employees, the employees must be dismissed. His Title VI claim was dismissed because only public and private entities—not individuals—can be held liable under Title VI. Costello’s § 1983 Equal Protection claim was dismissed based on qualified immunity. The court found that Granado’s allegations of discrimination were too general, that he failed to establish that similarly situated students received different treatment based on race (as opposed to coaching judgments about qualifications), and that the only concrete allegation of racist speech came from another coach, not Costello. Coach Ruvalcava was dismissed without prejudice for failure to serve within 90 days; Granado was given 14 days to show good cause. Granado was granted leave to amend until July 27, 2026.

Key Takeaways

  • Individual schools within a school district lack independent capacity to sue or be sued under Texas law; claims must name the district itself.
  • Title VI private right of action requires direct involvement by a school district (not just individual employees) and actual knowledge with deliberate indifference by a decision-maker; general allegations that coaches discriminated do not suffice.
  • § 1983 municipal liability requires either an official policy or a persistent, widespread practice; isolated allegations of individual coach misconduct do not establish either.
  • Qualified immunity protected the coach where allegations were too general about racial animus, failed to establish that similarly situated students received different treatment based on race, and the only specific racist comment came from a different coach, not the defendant.
  • School districts are immune from tort claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act except for motor vehicle operation; school district employees sued alongside the district are dismissed from tort claims.

Why It Matters

This decision illustrates the formidable pleading barriers plaintiffs face in asserting civil rights claims against school districts and individual school officials. The court applied strict pleading standards under Twombly/Iqbal, requiring that allegations move beyond conclusory statements to plausible factual matter. The opinion reinforces that Title VI requires district-level involvement and knowledge, not merely knowledge by school-level actors such as individual coaches. Similarly, § 1983 municipal liability cannot rest on isolated incidents but requires proof of an official policy or a widespread practice. These doctrines substantially narrow the avenues through which students can pursue systemic discrimination claims against public schools.

The qualified immunity holding is particularly significant: even accepting Granado’s allegations as true, the court found the right to non-discriminatory coach selection was not “clearly established” at the time of Costello’s conduct, given that coaching decisions involve subjective judgments about player qualifications and that Granado failed to adequately plead that race—rather than coaching judgment—drove the outcome. This substantially protects school officials from liability absent more particularized allegations of discriminatory intent. The Texas Tort Claims Act immunity adds another layer of protection, making negligence and emotional distress claims unavailable unless they involve motor vehicles, further limiting relief for injured students.

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