Reported / Citable
Background
Relator Amy C. Walden-Bing filed this qui tam action under the False Claims Act in May 2023. After the United States initially declined to intervene, the case was unsealed in July 2025. Walden-Bing’s attorney later withdrew with her consent, and she stated that she intended to proceed pro se.
Walden-Bing’s amended complaint asserted three FCA claims against Horne LLP and Deloitte LLP, along with claims for payment by mistake, unjust enrichment, and negligence based on alleged harm to the United States. The Government then intervened solely to seek dismissal, arguing that a relator cannot prosecute an FCA action without counsel. Walden-Bing opposed dismissal, requested a hearing, and made a passing request for leave to add unspecified whistleblower claims.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Yvonne Y. Ho recommended granting the Government’s motion and dismissing all claims without prejudice. Binding Fifth Circuit precedent bars Walden-Bing from prosecuting the FCA claims pro se because the underlying injury belongs to the Government, which is the real party in interest. The magistrate judge also concluded that Walden-Bing lacked Article III standing to pursue the common-law claims because they sought recovery for injuries to the United States rather than injuries to Walden-Bing herself.
The Government satisfied the requirements for dismissal under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1), particularly because the defendants had not answered or moved for summary judgment. The magistrate judge denied an evidentiary hearing because the statutory opportunity for a hearing was satisfied through briefing. She also denied leave to amend without prejudice because Walden-Bing had not identified her proposed claims or submitted a proposed pleading, while permitting her to file a compliant standalone motion by January 20, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- A qui tam relator may not litigate FCA claims pro se because the relator is pursuing an injury belonging to the United States.
- An FCA relator lacks standing to assert common-law claims seeking compensation for harm suffered by the Government.
- Section 3730(c)(2)(A) does not require an evidentiary hearing when the relator has received an opportunity to oppose dismissal through written briefing.
- A conclusory request to add unspecified claims, without a proposed pleading or identified legal theories, does not adequately seek leave to amend.
Why It Matters
The recommendation underscores that an FCA relator’s inability to obtain replacement counsel can end a qui tam case regardless of the relator’s view of its merits. Because the United States is the real party in interest, the relator cannot rely on the general right of self-representation to litigate the Government’s claims.
The opinion also distinguishes the FCA’s statutory assignment from ordinary common-law causes of action: a relator’s authority to pursue an FCA claim does not confer standing to seek recovery for the Government under unjust-enrichment, payment-by-mistake, or negligence theories.