Reported / Citable
Background
Putnam Darwin Richardson, age 80, was indicted in the Eastern District of Texas in August 2024 on charges of kidnapping, interstate extortionate communication, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. The charges arose from a 2024 abduction in which Richardson kidnapped his former defense attorney — who had represented him in a 1984 state aggravated kidnapping conviction — at gunpoint, bound and handcuffed him, placed a bag over his head, drove him to Richardson’s residence, shackled him in a shed, and demanded a $1 million ransom from the victim’s wife. Investigators rescued the victim two days later. Richardson was on parole for his 1984 kidnapping at the time of the 2024 offenses.
Richardson pleaded guilty in November 2024 to kidnapping and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. In April 2025, the court sentenced him to 294 months’ imprisonment — 210 months on the kidnapping count and 84 months on the firearm count, to run consecutively — with a projected release date of June 2, 2045. He did not appeal. Richardson is housed at FCI Forrest City Medium in Arkansas.
On March 23, 2026, Richardson filed a pro se emergency motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), asserting he had been diagnosed with terminal Stage IV prostate cancer. He sought immediate release to time served or, alternatively, a reduced sentence. The Government opposed the motion, and U.S. Probation recommended denial.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Marcia A. Crone dismissed the motion — or alternatively denied it — on the ground that Richardson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing. Section 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a defendant to submit a compassionate release request to the warden of his facility and either exhaust the BOP’s administrative appeal process or wait 30 days after the warden receives the request before seeking court relief. Richardson claimed he submitted an electronic request to the warden on March 12, 2026, but provided no documentary evidence of that submission. BOP records confirmed through a supervisory attorney that no administrative remedy requests existed for Richardson. Additionally, only 11 days elapsed between the alleged warden request and the filing of the court motion — well short of the mandatory 30-day waiting period.
The court held that the exhaustion requirement under § 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory and that it lacks authority to waive it, even in cases of claimed medical emergency. Citing Franco v. United States and the Fifth Circuit’s settled precedent, the court emphasized that because the Government properly raised the exhaustion issue, the court was obligated to enforce it. The court also questioned the truly emergent nature of Richardson’s condition, noting that his prostate cancer diagnosis dated to at least 2021 yet he did not seek administrative relief until March 2026 — and even then failed to supply evidence that he had actually done so.
The court further noted that, in any event, the § 3553(a) factors weighed heavily against release: Richardson had served only approximately 8% of his sentence, this was his second kidnapping conviction involving a firearm, the victim and the Government were both opposed to release, and Richardson would face an active Texas parole detainer if released.
Key Takeaways
- Administrative exhaustion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) is mandatory and non-waivable once the Government raises it — district courts have no discretion to excuse the requirement, even for claimed terminal illness or emergency circumstances.
- The defendant bears the burden of proving exhaustion, which requires documentary evidence that the warden actually received a compassionate release request and that at least 30 days elapsed before the court filing.
- A claimed medical emergency does not toll or excuse the 30-day waiting period; courts will scrutinize the timeline and consistency of the defendant’s medical disclosures when assessing the urgency of the claimed condition.
- Even where extraordinary and compelling reasons might otherwise exist, the § 3553(a) factors — including the nature of the offense, percentage of sentence served, and victim opposition — remain independently dispositive.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict procedural gatekeeping that governs compassionate release motions in the Fifth Circuit. Defense counsel should treat administrative exhaustion as a threshold prerequisite that cannot be bypassed by invoking urgency or terminal illness: without verifiable proof that the warden received a request and that the 30-day window has run, courts will dismiss motions outright regardless of the underlying medical merits. The ruling also illustrates how courts weigh the credibility of “emergency” filings when the medical condition at issue predates the motion by years.
The case also highlights the interplay between federal compassionate release and state parole detainers. Even if Richardson had cleared the procedural hurdles, a Texas parole revocation — stemming from his 1984 conviction — would have subjected him to immediate state custody upon any federal release, undercutting the practical value of the relief sought. Practitioners handling compassionate release matters for clients with concurrent state sentences should assess the detainer landscape before filing.