Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Texas Department of Public Safety Sergeant Ryan Glenn was driving a marked DPS vehicle before sunrise on U.S. 277 when he saw a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction above the speed limit. Glenn activated the vehicle’s overhead lights, moved onto the shoulder, checked his driver’s-side mirror, and began a U-turn to pursue the speeding vehicle. Jessica Abrego, who was attempting to pass on his left, was struck when Glenn’s vehicle sideswiped hers. Glenn had adjusted the driver’s seat after taking over but had not adjusted the side-view mirrors.
Abrego sued DPS under the Texas Tort Claims Act, alleging that Glenn negligently operated a government vehicle and caused her injuries. DPS asserted that Glenn was protected by official immunity and that DPS therefore retained sovereign immunity. The trial court denied DPS’s plea to the jurisdiction and its alternative summary-judgment motion, and DPS brought an interlocutory appeal.
The Court’s Holding
The Fourth Court of Appeals held that DPS conclusively established Glenn’s official immunity. The parties did not dispute that Glenn acted within the scope of his authority and performed a discretionary duty, leaving only whether he acted in objective good faith. Glenn’s testimony and affidavits from two experienced officers showed that a reasonably prudent officer in the same circumstances could have believed the U-turn was justified based on Glenn’s perception that no vehicle was behind him.
Abrego did not produce evidence that no reasonable officer could have believed Glenn’s conduct was justified. Her expert identified additional precautions Glenn should have taken, including looking behind him and lowering the window to see or hear approaching traffic, but that evidence addressed negligence or an alternative course of action rather than the governing official-immunity standard. The court also explained that alleged recklessness or violations of departmental policies did not, without more, controvert good faith. Because official immunity shielded Glenn from personal liability, the Texas Tort Claims Act did not waive DPS’s sovereign immunity.
The court reversed the order denying DPS’s plea to the jurisdiction, rendered judgment granting the plea, and dismissed all of Abrego’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Key Takeaways
- For official immunity, the question is whether any reasonably prudent officer could have believed the challenged conduct was justified—not whether the officer was negligent or should have acted differently.
- Once DPS conclusively established objective good faith, Abrego had to present evidence that no reasonable officer in Glenn’s position could have believed the U-turn was justified.
- An expert’s identification of safer precautions, alleged recklessness, or departmental-policy violations did not by itself create a fact issue on good faith.
- Because Glenn was officially immune from personal liability, DPS remained sovereignly immune under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the demanding evidentiary burden plaintiffs face when attempting to rebut an officer’s objective good faith. Evidence supporting negligence—even serious carelessness—is not necessarily enough; the evidence must show that no reasonably competent officer could have viewed the conduct as justified under the information available at the time.
The opinion also underscores the jurisdictional link between an employee’s official immunity and a governmental employer’s sovereign immunity in motor-vehicle cases under the Texas Tort Claims Act. If the employee would not be personally liable because of official immunity, the Act’s waiver does not expose the governmental unit to vicarious liability.