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Nelson v. Mistras Group Inc. — Court grants employer summary judgment on Section 1981 claims

Reported / Citable

Case
Ariel Nelson v. Mistras Group Inc.
Court
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
Judge
Robert W. Schroeder III
Date Decided
September 2, 2026
Docket No.
4:25-CV-757-RWS-JBB
Topics
Employment Discrimination; Section 1981; Retaliation; Hostile Work Environment

Background

Ariel Nelson, an African-American former employee of Mistras Group Inc., sued the company under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She alleged that Mistras discriminated against her because of race by reassigning her, subjecting her to unfair performance standards and treatment, and ultimately terminating her employment. She also asserted retaliation and hostile-work-environment claims.

Mistras moved for summary judgment on all three claims. A magistrate judge recommended granting the motion and dismissing the action, and Nelson objected. The district court conducted a de novo review of the challenged portions of the recommendation.

The Court’s Holding

The court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and granted summary judgment to Mistras. On the discrimination claim, Nelson did not produce evidence that her proposed non-Black comparators were similarly situated. The record showed that Nelson received a performance score of 12 out of 32, while the identified coworkers received scores between 23 and 27. Her written rebuttal criticized the evaluation process and her lack of notice about expectations but did not provide evidence that the evaluation inaccurately measured her performance.

The court also found insufficient evidence of pretext or discriminatory intent. Mistras’s statements that Nelson was terminated for poor performance and that her position was eliminated were not sufficiently inconsistent to create a triable issue, and any possible evidence of pretext did not support an inference that race was the real reason for the termination. The retaliation claim failed because Nelson’s rebuttal complained only of unfair treatment, without identifying race discrimination, and therefore was not protected activity under § 1981. The hostile-work-environment claim likewise failed because Nelson presented no evidence that her reassignment, termination, ignored communications, or other alleged mistreatment was racially motivated.

Key Takeaways

  • A discrimination plaintiff opposing summary judgment must support comparator allegations with evidence that the proposed comparators were similarly situated.
  • Disputing an employer’s evaluation process, without evidence contradicting the evaluation’s assessment of performance, does not itself create a genuine issue of material fact.
  • A complaint about workplace unfairness is not protected activity under § 1981 unless it communicates opposition to race-based discrimination.

Why It Matters

The decision illustrates the evidentiary gap that can separate allegations sufficient at the pleading stage from proof sufficient to survive summary judgment. Even assuming reassignment could qualify as an adverse employment action, Nelson needed record evidence connecting the treatment to race, establishing valid comparators, or showing that Mistras’s stated reasons concealed intentional discrimination. Because that evidence was absent, the court dismissed the action with prejudice.

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