Reported / Citable
Background
The district court remanded Paul Michael Nejtek’s Social Security case to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) on January 20, 2026. Nejtek then moved unopposed for fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
He requested $8,500 in attorney’s fees for 36.4 attorney hours at an effective hourly rate of $214.65, plus $405 for the filing fee. Although the submitted ledger included paralegal time, the magistrate judge treated the reduced fee request as seeking compensation only for attorney work.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge Matthew H. Watters recommended granting the unopposed EAJA motion. The recommendation concluded that Nejtek qualified for fees because the sentence-four remand made him a prevailing party, his application was timely, he alleged an unopposed lack of substantial justification for the government’s position, and he averred that his net worth did not exceed $2 million.
The magistrate judge also found the requested rate and hours reasonable. A cost-of-living adjustment was warranted because inflation had materially increased since the EAJA’s $125 hourly cap was last adjusted, and the requested $214.65 rate was below the calculated CPI-U-adjusted rates for 2025 and 2026. The recommendation would award $8,500 in fees and $405 in costs, payable to Nejtek and sent to his counsel, subject to any federal debt offset; the filing-fee cost would be paid separately from the Judgment Fund.
Key Takeaways
- A sentence-four Social Security remand supports prevailing-party status for EAJA purposes.
- An unopposed allegation that the government’s position lacked substantial justification satisfied the applicable eligibility requirement here.
- The magistrate judge found 36.4 attorney hours and a $214.65 hourly rate reasonable for this Social Security appeal.
Why It Matters
The ruling underscores that successful Social Security claimants may recover reasonable EAJA fees after a sentence-four remand, including time spent seeking fees. It also illustrates the use of regional CPI-U data to support a cost-of-living adjustment above the statute’s nominal hourly cap.
This was a report and recommendation, not a final district-court fee award. The parties had 14 days to object.