Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In 2016, a federal district court entered an $18.6 million judgment against co-defendants Marko Princip and Brian Martin on claims arising from a partnership dispute. Six years later, when the judgment creditors sought to collect, Martin returned to the district court and asserted for the first time that he had never authorized Princip’s attorney to represent him.
Because the deadline for seeking ordinary relief from the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) had passed, Martin invoked Rule 60(d)(3), which permits a court to set aside a judgment for fraud on the court without a specified time limit. The district court concluded that Martin had not established fraud on the court by clear and convincing evidence and denied relief.
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Martin’s Rule 60(d)(3) motion. Fraud on the court requires exceptionally serious misconduct—such as an unconscionable plan designed to improperly influence the court—and must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
Martin offered only speculation and a signed but unsworn witness statement to support his claim that the attorney lacked authority to represent him. The court concluded that this evidence did not establish either unauthorized representation or a scheme intended to corrupt the judicial process. Although Martin’s allegations raised concerns about the quality of his representation, they did not satisfy Rule 60(d)(3)’s demanding standard.
The court also emphasized that Martin did not explain why the alleged conduct could not have been discovered earlier. A party cannot wait years after an adverse judgment and then mount a collateral attack based on grounds that were previously available.
Key Takeaways
- Relief for fraud on the court under Rule 60(d)(3) requires clear and convincing evidence of egregious misconduct aimed at improperly influencing the court.
- Speculation and an unsworn witness statement were insufficient to prove that counsel lacked authority to represent Martin or participated in a fraudulent scheme.
- Rule 60(d)(3) has no specified time limit, but it does not permit parties to revive long-available objections after sitting on their rights for years.
Why It Matters
The decision reinforces the narrow scope of Rule 60(d)(3). Allegations of unauthorized or deficient representation, even when potentially serious, do not amount to fraud on the court without strong evidence of a deliberate scheme that compromised the judicial process.
For judgment debtors and their counsel, the opinion also underscores the importance of raising representation, notice, and jurisdictional objections promptly rather than relying on a later collateral challenge.