Reported / Citable
Background
In 2004, Frost Bank obtained a default judgment against Corey Morrell. Frost subsequently retained the law firm Fridge & Resendez, P.C. and attorney John Resendez to enforce that judgment, which included filing an abstract of judgment in the Johnson County deed records and seeking writs of execution. More than two decades later, in 2025, Morrell — acting pro se — filed suit in Tarrant County against Frost Bank and the Resendez Firm, asserting claims for fraudulent lien filing, abuse of process, and violations of the Texas Debt Collection Act (TDCA) against both defendants, as well as vicarious liability and negligent hiring and supervision against Frost, and a TDCA bond-violation claim against the Resendez Firm. He also sought a permanent injunction barring Frost from further post-judgment enforcement efforts.
Both Frost Bank and the Resendez Firm moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA), Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute, arguing that Morrell’s claims were based on their exercise of the constitutional right to petition. Morrell opposed the motions, contending that the commercial-speech exemption shielded his claims from TCPA dismissal, that the TCPA did not otherwise reach his claims, and that he had presented sufficient prima facie evidence. He also conditionally requested limited discovery under TCPA Section 27.006(b). Morrell failed to appear at the hearing on Frost’s motion, citing a vacation. The trial court granted both motions and awarded Frost $43,330.47 in attorney’s fees.
The Court’s Holding
The Second Court of Appeals affirmed on all points. At step one of the TCPA’s burden-shifting framework, the court held that post-judgment collection activities — including filing an abstract of judgment and seeking writs of execution — constitute an exercise of the right to petition, bringing Morrell’s claims squarely within the TCPA’s scope. The court further held that the commercial-speech exemption did not apply: Morrell failed to show that the defendants acted in their capacity as sellers of goods or services, or that the complained-of conduct targeted actual or potential customers. The court observed that Frost acted as a judgment creditor, not a financial-services vendor, and the Resendez Firm acted as Frost’s counsel, not as a seller of legal services.
At step two, the court found that Morrell failed to present clear and specific evidence of any essential element of his claims. His verified declaration — which was in any event formally defective for omitting the statutorily required date-of-birth jurat — merely recited his own contentions that the underlying judgment was voidable or dormant, without providing evidentiary support. His TDCA bond-violation claim failed additionally because he neither alleged nor proved that the Resendez Firm qualified as a “third-party debt collector” subject to the bond requirement, and he offered no evidence of actual damages. The court also noted that most of Morrell’s claims appeared time-barred. As for the discovery request, the court found it unpreserved because Morrell never set the matter for hearing or otherwise obtained a ruling. The attorney’s fee award was upheld as supported by a detailed, uncontroverted attorney declaration.
Key Takeaways
- Post-judgment collection activities — filing abstracts of judgment, seeking writs of execution, and related enforcement steps — constitute the exercise of the right to petition under the TCPA, subjecting lawsuits challenging those activities to anti-SLAPP dismissal.
- The commercial-speech exemption requires that the defendant acted in its capacity as a seller of goods or services and that the conduct was aimed at actual or potential customers; a creditor enforcing its own judgment and counsel acting for that creditor do not satisfy those elements.
- A pro se plaintiff’s unsworn declaration that merely restates legal contentions, and that lacks the date-of-birth jurat required by Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 132.001(d), is insufficient to satisfy the TCPA’s clear-and-specific-evidence standard at step two.
- To preserve a TCPA discovery request under Section 27.006(b) for appellate review, the requesting party must affirmatively bring it to the trial court’s attention and obtain a ruling — appearing at the relevant hearing is critical.
- Once a TCPA dismissal is granted, attorney’s fees are mandatory under Section 27.009(a)(1); an uncontroverted, detailed fee declaration is sufficient to support the award.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute is an effective procedural shield for creditors and their counsel against retaliatory litigation arising from routine post-judgment enforcement. Lawyers hired to collect judgments can invoke the TCPA’s right-to-petition prong without needing to show that their conduct implicated a matter of public concern — a distinction the court emphasized and that is frequently misunderstood by pro se litigants and practitioners alike.
The opinion also offers a practical reminder about the limits of the commercial-speech exemption: the exemption turns on the defendant’s capacity at the time of the challenged conduct, not the defendant’s general line of business. Creditors acting to collect debts and attorneys acting as collection counsel are not, in that capacity, selling services to customers — and plaintiffs who fail to grasp this distinction will struggle to escape TCPA dismissal. For litigants seeking limited TCPA discovery, the case underscores that a conditional, embedded discovery request is insufficient; the movant must independently set the matter for hearing and make an affirmative showing of good cause.