Reported / Citable
Background
Weston Merriott, an online journalist, attended multiple Bossier City Council meetings in Louisiana to speak about a term limits petition. At the July 18 and August 1 meetings, Merriott criticized the council’s handling of the petition and questioned the impartiality of outside counsel. Councilmembers interrupted him and instructed him to “stay on topic.” After a secret meeting was later revealed—captured in an audio recording—in which councilmembers discussed changing public comment rules to limit discussion, the council enacted a Policy prohibiting “personal, impertinent or slanderous remarks” and “boisterous” conduct at its meetings.
On August 15, the City Clerk read the new Policy aloud before the meeting. When Merriott again criticized the council, he was interrupted. The City Council unanimously voted to characterize his remarks as “disruptive” in the meeting minutes. Merriott subsequently sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the Policy as facially overbroad and void for vagueness. The district court dismissed all claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
The Court’s Holding
The Fifth Circuit reversed in part, holding that Merriott stated plausible facial overbreadth and vagueness claims. Applying overbreadth doctrine, the court first determined that Merriott was permitted to bring the challenge because he identified hypothetical applications of the Policy distinct from his own conduct—satisfying the threshold test that the challengers’ rights not be “essentially coterminous” with third parties’ rights. The court then analyzed each term in the Policy by its ordinary meaning.
Construing “personal remarks,” the court found the Policy prohibits speakers from using councilmembers’ names, mentioning potential conflicts of interest, noting past convictions, or raising concerns about impartiality—a virtually limitless range of protected speech. For “impertinent remarks,” the court found no limiting principle, allowing the Council to silence speakers arbitrarily based on whether a councilmember is offended. The court reaffirmed prior precedent holding that prohibitions on “slanderous” speech, without distinguishing constitutionally unprotected defamation, are overbroad. Finally, the court held that a standalone ban on “becoming boisterous” is too broad because it encompasses protected conduct like emphatic gestures, pointing, and passionate tone—and enforcement turns entirely on whether a councilmember is annoyed, echoing the Supreme Court’s analysis in Coates v. City of Cincinnati.
The court also held the Policy void for vagueness. The undefined terms “personal” and “impertinent” turn on listener sensitivity alone and fail to provide reasonable notice of prohibited conduct. Similarly, “boisterous” is unconstitutionally vague because its meaning depends on each official’s subjective sensibilities. The court rejected appellees’ argument that dictionary definitions cure constitutional defects, noting that the Supreme Court in Coates rejected this approach.
Key Takeaways
- City council decorum policies must be narrowly tailored and cannot ban vague, subjective categories of speech like “personal,” “impertinent,” or “boisterous” remarks.
- Overbreadth challenges to speech regulations are permissible when plaintiffs identify realistic applications of the challenged rule affecting third parties, even if the regulation also reaches the plaintiff’s conduct.
- Terms undefined by statute or ordinance are interpreted by ordinary meaning; a regulation’s facial invalidity is not cured by the existence of common dictionary definitions.
- Where a regulation restricts core First Amendment activity in a forum designed for public debate, its “legitimate sweep” must be carefully limited, and the government cannot justify sweeping restrictions merely to maintain decorum.
Why It Matters
This decision provides significant protection for citizens speaking at public council meetings. By striking down the Bossier City Policy on its face, the Fifth Circuit prevents the government from silencing speech merely because it criticizes councilmembers or because officials find it impertinent or disruptive. The ruling reaffirms that government bodies cannot hide behind vague decorum rules to restrict robust debate on public issues—a principle at the “heart of the First Amendment tradition.” The decision is particularly important given the factual context: the council appeared to change its rules in reaction to Merriott’s specific speech criticizing the council’s judgment.
The court’s analysis provides a roadmap for challenging similar speech restrictions in other local government forums. By parsing each term in the ordinance and assessing whether it encompasses a “substantial number of unconstitutional applications,” the court makes clear that policies regulating public comment must be particularized and avoid open-ended categories dependent on official sensibilities. Municipalities relying on comparable language in their meeting protocols should review and revise them to provide clear guidance and avoid arbitrary enforcement.