Reported / Citable
Background
Alejandro David Rochart Machado, a Cuban national, entered the United States without inspection in 2022 and was apprehended by immigration officials shortly thereafter. He was released on an Order of Recognizance and spent over three years in the community, maintaining stable residence, consistent employment, and complying with all supervision requirements. He has no criminal history and has U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident family members. On November 14, 2025, Machado was re-detained at a routine ICE check-in appointment without advance warning and without any allegation that he had violated his conditions of release.
Following a July 2025 DHS/DOJ policy shift and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025), the government took the position that all noncitizens who have not been formally admitted — including those who entered without inspection — are subject to mandatory detention under INA § 235, codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). The Fifth Circuit endorsed that statutory interpretation in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), holding that § 1225(b)(2) applies to all applicants for admission regardless of whether they are actively seeking admission at the time of detention. Under that framework, Machado received no bond hearing during his detention.
Machado filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Southern District of Texas, arguing, among other grounds, that his indefinite detention without an individualized bond hearing violated procedural and substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment. An Immigration Judge ordered him removed while the petition was pending, but Machado timely appealed to the BIA, leaving the removal order non-final. The government moved for summary judgment, contending that Buenrostro compelled his continued detention and foreclosed any due process challenge.
The Court’s Holding
Judge John A. Kazen granted the habeas petition in part, finding that Machado’s detention without constitutionally adequate procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and ordered his release by June 2, 2026 at 5:00 p.m. The court held that Buenrostro-Mendez resolved only the statutory question of whether § 1225(b)(2) covers noncitizens who entered without inspection; it did not foreclose as-applied due process challenges to mandatory detention under that provision. Applying the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and incorporating its prior analysis in Lopez Moncebais v. Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-268 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 27, 2026), the court found that Machado’s liberty interest was substantial and that the government’s procedures were constitutionally deficient.
The court identified two reinforcing sources of liberty interest. First, Machado’s continuous residence in the United States since 2022 created a cognizable liberty interest requiring individualized justification for civil detention. Second, his prior release on an Order of Recognizance and three-plus years of uninterrupted freedom created a reasonable expectation — grounded in Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005) — that he would not be detained without an opportunity to seek bond during removal proceedings. The government offered no justification for the sudden re-detention at a routine check-in, and presented no evidence that Machado posed a flight risk or danger to the community.
The court exercised its equitable discretion to order immediate release rather than remand for a bond hearing. It reasoned that: (1) § 1226(a), which authorizes bond hearings, does not apply to applicants for admission under Buenrostro; (2) a belated hearing would not remedy the liberty deprivation already suffered; and (3) the BIA’s position in Matter of Yajure Hurtado means an Immigration Judge would likely decline jurisdiction to conduct a bond hearing even if ordered to do so. The government’s motion for summary judgment was denied. The court also denied Machado’s request for attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act.
Key Takeaways
- The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Buenrostro-Mendez that § 1225(b)(2) covers all unadmitted noncitizens does not eliminate as-applied procedural due process challenges; detainees may still argue that indefinite detention without an individualized hearing violates the Fifth Amendment.
- A noncitizen’s prior release from immigration custody and extended period of community residence create liberty interests — grounded in both physical freedom and reasonable expectation — that the Due Process Clause protects and that must be overcome with individualized justification before re-detention.
- Where the BIA has stripped Immigration Judges of jurisdiction to conduct bond hearings for § 1225(b)(2) detainees, ordering a bond hearing is an inadequate remedy; the constitutionally appropriate remedy for the due process violation is immediate release from custody.
- Respondents must return identity documents and personal effects upon release and afford procedural due process under the Fifth Amendment if the petitioner is re-detained.
Why It Matters
This decision is part of a growing body of district court rulings — concentrated in the Southern District of Texas and other circuits — that have found a constitutional floor beneath the government’s expanding use of mandatory detention for noncitizens who entered without inspection. Even as Buenrostro-Mendez closed the statutory door to bond hearings under § 1226(a) within the Fifth Circuit, courts in that circuit are using habeas corpus and Mathews v. Eldridge balancing to impose due process limits on how long and under what circumstances those detainees can be held without any individualized review.
For practitioners, the ruling underscores that prior release and length of community residence are affirmative litigation tools in § 1225(b)(2) detention challenges — not merely sympathetic background facts. It also highlights the practical remedial gap created when the BIA eliminates Immigration Judge jurisdiction over bond hearings: district courts may conclude that release, not a hearing, is the only viable constitutional remedy, giving habeas petitions in this context an unusually direct path to client freedom.