Reported / Citable
Background
Richard Lowman brought a putative class action against his employer, Enterprise Financial Group, Inc., after an unauthorized third party allegedly accessed and copied files from EFG’s network. Lowman alleged that the February 2024 cyberattack compromised personally identifiable information and private health information. He also alleged that unknown persons later applied for loans in his name, harming his credit score.
Lowman asserted negligence, negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence, and breach of implied contract. EFG removed the case under diversity jurisdiction and the Class Action Fairness Act, then moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. Lowman withdrew his breach-of-confidence and implied-contract claims.
The Court’s Holding
In findings and recommendations to the district judge, the magistrate judge concluded that Lowman had Article III standing based on his alleged loss of privacy and severe emotional distress. The other asserted injuries—including increased risk of fraud or identity theft, time spent monitoring accounts, diminished value of personal information, and loss of the benefit of the bargain—were insufficient. The magistrate judge also rejected EFG’s jurisdictional argument based on an earlier settlement agreement because the present claims were not mentioned in that agreement, arose from later events, and in any event presented a merits issue rather than a jurisdictional bar.
The magistrate judge nevertheless recommended dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). Lowman did not plausibly plead a duty, breach, or proximate causation for negligence; the statutes underlying negligence per se supplied no private right of action; Texas law generally imposes no fiduciary duty on an employer toward an employee; and Lowman did not adequately allege that he conferred a benefit on EFG through fraud, duress, or undue advantage. The recommendation was to dismiss all claims without prejudice and allow Lowman an opportunity to cure the pleading defects, with dismissal potentially becoming prejudicial if he failed to amend within 14 days after acceptance of the recommendation.
Key Takeaways
- Alleged loss of privacy and severe emotional distress were sufficient at the pleading stage to establish injury in fact from the data breach.
- Standing did not establish a viable claim: Lowman still had to plead facts supporting every element of his Texas-law causes of action.
- The magistrate judge recommended dismissal without prejudice and an opportunity to amend; the document was not a final ruling by the district judge.
Why It Matters
The recommendation illustrates the distinction between constitutional standing and merits sufficiency in data-breach litigation. A plaintiff may allege a concrete injury adequate for federal jurisdiction yet still lose under Rule 12(b)(6) by relying on conclusory allegations about duty, causation, fiduciary relationships, or benefits conferred.
It also shows that an earlier general release does not automatically eliminate jurisdiction over claims arising from a later cyberattack, particularly when those claims were not within the release’s stated subject matter.